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International arbitration is a lynchpin of international economic activity.'
Yet concerns linger about the integrity of international arbitration and recent
critiques cast doubt on whether it properly provides rule of law adjudication
or whether arbitrators engage in improper decision-making. 2 Despite the
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Arbitration for considering an earlier draft of this Essay in the Final Report addressing "Privilege
and Professional Secrecy" in international arbitration.
1.
See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, EmpiricalFindingsin InternationalArbitration:An
Overview, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Thomas Schultz & Federico
Ortino eds.) (forthcoming), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2888552 [https://perma.cc/39C47HSV] (last visited Oct. 26, 2019); see also Gary Born, A New Generation of International
Adjudication, 61 DuKE L.J. 775, 779-81, 826-42 (2012) (exploring the modern role of
international adjudicative bodies and their value in providing enforceable decisions and
describing the rise of international arbitration).
2.
The
Arbitration
Game,
ECONOMIST
(Oct.
11,
2014),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2014/10/1 1/the-arbitration-game
[https://perma.cc/VK6D-TC6K]; see also Susan D. Franck, et al., Inside the Arbitrator'sMind,
66 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1119-29 (2017) (providing a primer on international arbitration and
identifying controversies about international arbitration).
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enhanced public scrutiny, 3 international arbitration is nevertheless on the rise
for the resolution of commercial and investment disputes.4
Whether arbitration occurs in a commercial context between private
parties involving conflicts under transnational commercial contracts or in a
treaty context between investors and states involving investment disputes
about the legality of government conduct, the core values of international
arbitration involve ease of award enforcement, predictable rule of law-based
adjudication, and procedural justice that provides party control over
procedure.5 As production of documents is a standard part of international
procedure and can make or break a case, privilege determinations play a
critical role in arbitration.6 Yet assessments about what must be disclosed,
3.
See, e.g., Arbitrating Disputes, Denying Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/opinion/sunday/arbitrating-disputes-denyingjustice.html?ref=topics [https://perma.cc/M2GN-DME9]; see also Born, supra note 1, at 779-81,
826-42 (exploring the modern role of international adjudicative bodies and their value in
providing enforceable decisions and describing the rise of international arbitration); Drahozal,
supra note 1; The Arbitration Game, supra note 2 (discussing arbitration in connection with
resolving international investment disputes); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff,
Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/0 1/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-thedeck-of-justice.html?_rl- [https://perma.cc/PR38-7LGC] (identifying challenges with private
commercial arbitration); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a
'Privatization of
the
Justice
System,'
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html?ref=topics [https://perma.cc/4WD8-D5YF] (same); David Simonds, Why the
European Union Should Not Ditch Bilateral Investment Treaties, ECONOMIST (June 8, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/06/08/why-the-european-union-should-not-ditchbilateral-investment-treaties [https://perma.cc/XP4D-PIKT] (discussing challenges with
international investment dispute settlement and arbitration).
4.
See S.I. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky Defaults, Status Quo Bias,
and the Sovereign PrerogativeInfluence the PerceivedLegitimacy of InternationalArbitration,
2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 534 (2018) (noting "usage rates have also risen to unprecedented
heights" and indicating "up to 90% of all international commercial contracts currently include an
arbitration provision, with similar mechanisms in place in approximately 93% of the 3,000-5,000
international investment treaties now in effect.") (footnotes omitted); see also Drahozal, supra
note 1 (discussing data reflecting increases in international arbitration); Andrew Myburgh & Jordi
Paniagua, Does InternationalCommercial ArbitrationPromote ForeignDirect Investment?, 59
J.L. & EcoN. 597, 597 (2016) (conducting empirical research on international investment and
international commercial arbitration and finding that "access to arbitration leads to an increase in
[foreign direct investment] flows").
5.
See, e.g., Diane A. Desierto, RawlsianFairnessand InternationalArbitration,36 U. PA.
J. INT'L L. 939, 972-73 (2015) (discussing norms related to fairness and party-control).
6.
See, e.g., JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

553-83 (2003) (exploring procedural considerations

regarding evidential issues and fact-gathering in international arbitration); Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, Globalization ofArbitralProcedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1325-30 (2003)
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what must be withheld as privileged, and the basis for those assessments
involve a classic cross-cultural and comparative law conflict.7 The perennial
problem of resolving privilege conflicts and document confidentiality is not
theoretical. Privilege involves a practical and prevalent challenge affecting
one of the most financially extensive elements of any dispute, namely
gathering and disclosing one's own evidence and testing the evidence of the
other side.8 Those actively practicing in the area have posited that "the issue
of attorney-client privilege is exceptionally significant and is exceedingly
frequent in both international commercial and investment arbitration."9

(exploring the importance of procedures, including related to evidence and discovery, in
international arbitration); see also Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Evidentiary Privileges in
InternationalArbitration, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 345, 345-53, 371-72, 378 (2001) (discussing
evidentiary issues, including issues involving attorney-client privilege).
7.
See, e.g., Cldmence Prevot, The Taking of Evidence in International Commercial
Arbitration:A Compromise Between Common Law and Civil Law, 71 DisP. RESOL. J. 73 (2016)
(exploring evidence collection and comparative law approaches); Javier H. Rubinstein,
InternationalCommercialArbitration: Reflections at the Crossroads of the Common Law and
CivilLaw Traditions,5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 303, 304-09 (2004) (discussing challenges with discovery,
privilege, and evidence presentation in international arbitration).
8.
See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2375-76 (2d ed.
2014); Caroline Cavassin Klamas, Finding a Balance Between Different Standards of Privilege
to Enable Predictability, Fairness and Equality in International Arbitration, 12 REVISTA
BRASJLERIA DE ARBITRAGEM 159, 160 (2015) (Braz.) (suggesting privilege can be "particularly
delicate because if the rules concerning privilege turn to be unbalanced, then the award may be
in jeopardy of being annulled or having its enforcement refused.., because the equality of the
parties and the fairness of the proceedings are important elements of due process"); Diana
Kuitkowski, The Law Applicable to Privilege Claims in InternationalArbitration, 32 J. INT'L
ARB. 65, 65-66 (2015) (U.K.) (identifying the importance of privilege issues yet observing "legal
issues regarding privilege determinations in international arbitration are diverse, complex and
often disputed due to several factors. First, the nature of evidentiary privileges varies between
common law and civil law systems. Second, there are essential differences among legal systems
in qualifying privileges as substantive or procedural. Third, there are no established conflict of
laws rules for determining the law applicable to privilege claims in international arbitration");
Olaf Meyer, Time to Take a Closer Look: Privilege in InternationalArbitration, 24 J. INT'L ARB.
365, 365-66 (2007) (U.K.) (emphasizing that privilege and evidence issues are fundamental yet
noting there is no consistent, uniform or predictable approach to privilege); Patricia Shaughnessy,
Dealingwith Privileges in InternationalCommercialArbitration, 51 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN
LAW [Sc. ST. L.] 452, 452 (2007) ("[w]ithin the context of evidentiary issues, privileges pose the
greatest challenge to arbitrators" because they "frequently have to balance the demand for
promoting efficiency and controlling obstruction with the requirement of providing the right to
be heard and equal treatment").
9.
Ibrahim Shehata, Attorney-Client Privilege and InternationalArbitration,20 CARDOzO
J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 363, 367 (2019); see also Kuitkowski, supra note 8, at 65-66
(discussing the breadth of privilege issues in international arbitration). The empirical claims are
based upon an untested assumption, namely that non-public awards or procedural orders (if
published) would elucidate the scope of the theorized problem. There are inevitably challenges
when making inferences about parameters on the basis of the lack of non-public information.
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In transnational disputes, privilege issues are particularly thorny, as
stakeholders can easily bring different assumptions about their own national
rules to the table and presume those apply.
Yet, in a dispute involving the United States, France, Iran, and China, each
and every party (and their lawyers)-where documents, transactions, and
communications transcend borders-it is not necessarily clear which national
(or international) norms govern privilege and confidentiality. Experts like
Klaus Peter Berger have remarked that, when it comes to privilege in
international arbitration, the "only thing that is clear is that nothing is clear"
with the law being "substantially unsettled" and with "very little authority
addressing how international arbitrators should proceed" on privilege
questions, including those related to attorney-client privilege.'0
Yet the law and legal norms are fundamental, as they have the power to
shape the type and form of legal communications lawyers undertake, impact
counsel advice, inform parties' settlement opportunities, and affect

downstream behavior about how to organize business activity and
transnational legal advice." While U.S. in-house counsel may presume their
communications are privileged, they may be shocked to learn that their
conversations with in-house counsel counterparts in Europe may not benefit
from attorney-client privilege 2 - meaning internal conversations about
10. Klaus Peter Berger, EvidentiaryPrivileges:Best PracticeStandardsversuslandArbitral
Discretion,22 ARB. INT'L 501, 501 (2006) (footnotes omitted); see also Victoria Shannon Sahani,
Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REv. 388, 446 (2016) (identifying privilege
difficulties in international arbitration); Rachel Reiser, Note, Applying Privilege in International
Arbitration: The Casefor a Uniform Rule, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 653, 653-54,
659-62 (2012) (exploring challenges about the predictability of applicable privileges in
international arbitration).
11. Law firms even solicit clients by focusing on how their law firm may be able to aid
clients in navigating privilege issues in global investigations and transnational dispute settlement.
See, e.g., Are We Speaking the Same Language? Privilege Issues in Cross-Border Litigation,
Investigations,and InternationalArbitration, GIBSON, DuNN & CRUTCHER LLP (May 16, 2017),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/WebcastSIidesPrivilege-Issues-in-Cross-Border-Litigation-Investigations-and-Internatina-Arbitratin- 16May-2017.pdf [https ://perma.cc/JP4J-X5VV]; Norton Rose Fullbright LLP, NavigatingPrivilege
in Global Investigations, CORP. & COM. DIsP. REv., Apr. 2016, at 8-12,
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/13 8878/navigating-privilege-inglobal-investigations [https ://perma.cc/9V7X-JZPJ].
12. In the United States, for example, in-house counsel are attorneys for the purposes of
attorney-client privilege. In many European jurisdictions, in-house counsel are not necessarily
completely protected by privilege, and even the English version of attorney-client privilege
(called legal professional privilege) has restrictions that may prevent attorneys or their direct
representatives from securing legal privilege. Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 349-53; see also
Stephen A. Calhoun, Globalization's Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and What U.S.
Courts Can Do to Prevent It, 87 TEx. L. REv. 235, 238-47 (2008) (exploring European law on
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strategy can be discoverable, put into evidence, and potentially become part
of the public domain.' 3 As one arbitrator observed, "it is absolutely mind
boggling how the world's attorney/client privilege rules are so different, with
many nuances that attach to each country."' 4
At its core, privilege issues' 5 affect evidence admissibility, which impacts
the facts tribunals can rely upon during adjudication, which can become
outcome determinative and influence whether a party wins or loses a dispute.
Although safeguards for attorney-client relationship and/or client
privilege); Richard S. Pike, The English Law of Legal Professional Privilege: A Guide for
American Attorneys, 4 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 51, 63-71 (2006) (exploring differences in
treatment of in-house and external counsel resulting from the seminal Three Rivers decision in
England); see also RBS Rights Issue Litigation [2016] EWHC (Ch.) 3161 [196] (Eng.),
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2016/3161 html
[https://perma.cc/Z5MC-VGZ4]
(last visited Sept. 4, 2019) (observing that documents may have been subject to U.S.-based
attorney-client privilege where they were created during an internal investigation, but because of
the narrow definition of a "client" and English precedent, the English High Court refused to find
the documents were privileged); Serious Fraud Office (SFO) v. Eurasian Nat. Res. Corp. Ltd.
[2018] EWCA
(Civ) 2006
[91]-[109],
[121]-[27],
[138]-[40],
[144]
(Eng.),
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2018/2006.html
[https://perma.cc/A2W9-L3QL]
(last visited Sept. 4, 2019) (articulating how the English Court of Appeal had a broader
understanding of activity in "reasonable contemplation" of litigation to include internal
investigations but upholding the narrow interpretation of the meaning of a client under English
privilege law).
13. Professor Catherine Rogers offers the seminal review of ethics and professional conduct
in international arbitration, providing a broad overview of the laws of ethics and privilege,
identifying fundamental challenges that create a vacuum of regulation of attorney conduct. See,
e.g., CATHERINE ROGERS, ETHIcS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 104-11, 115-20, 124-26
(2014); see also ANNABELLE MOCKESCH, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (2017) (exploring the law of privilege in international arbitration, with a focus on
different national law norms); Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client
Privilege:A TerritorialSolution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 913-14 (1991) (discussing the shared
Anglo-Saxon and Roman law policy interests underlying the history of conceptions of attorneyclient privilege); Leah M. Christensen, A Comparison of the Duty of Confidentiality and the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the U.S. and China: Developing a Rule ofLaw, 34 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 171, 172-86 (2011) (comparing legal professional duties in China and the U.S.); Shehata,
supra note 9, at 372-75 (exploring variations among attorney-client privilege in the U.S.,
England, Germany, and Switzerland).
14. Richard Levin, Privilege and InternationalArbitration,KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 14,
2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/08/14/privilege-internationalarbitration/ [https://perma.cc/XC5Y-7MG2].
15. Privilege issues can be broad and cover a variety of topics. For example, privilege may
focus on attorney-client privilege (called legal professional privilege in some jurisdictions),
attorney work product (called litigation privilege in some jurisdictions), national security
privilege (sometimes called crown prosecution privilege or state secrets privilege in some
jurisdictions), or some other form of privilege. See, e.g., FRtDtRIC G. SOURGENS, KABIR DUGGAL
& IAN A. LAIRD, EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 237-59 (2018). Given
the need for focus and because of the dominance and importance of regulating lawyer-client
relationships, this Essay focuses primarily on attorney-client privilege involving the
confidentiality of communications between lawyers and clients.
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confidences are recognized in many countries, its doctrinal basis and scope
differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 6 Legal professional privilege, often
in the form of attorney-client privilege, is widely respected and applied in
common law jurisdictions where the normative value of potentially relevant
evidence is displaced in favor of the societal value on facilitating a full and
frank discussion among lawyers, clients, and their agents to provide the best
possible legal advice for contentious and non-contentious matters. 7 In civil
law jurisdictions, the protections afforded to the attorney-client relationship
are not necessarily so broad.'" Perhaps due to a civil law preference for more
limited discovery and evidence production generally, the doctrinal protection
is more focused upon protecting client confidences 9 and, in some instances,
only extends to the prosecution or defense of a claim."z While the purpose of
different normative approaches may all ultimately involve enhancing the
quality of and value in the legal representation of clients, the distinct doctrinal
norms for accomplishing that objective create a patchwork of legal

16. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 8, at 2377; MOCKESCH, supra note 13, at 2-3, 123-35.
17. Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 347; Craig Tevendale & Ula Cartwright-Finch,
Privilege in InternationalArbitration: Is It Time to Recognize the Consensus, 26 J. INT'L ARB.
823, 825 (2009); see also Raiffeisen Bank Int'l AG v. Asia Coal Energy Ventures Ltd. [2019]
EWHC
(Comm) 3 (Eng.)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2019/3.html
[https://perma.cc/36W3-D523] (last visited Sept. 4, 2019) (providing legal professional privilege
in the context of transactions to protect confidential client instructions).
18. Some scholars, however, have suggested that in some instances civil law confidentiality
obligations can be broader than common law attorney-client privilege. For example, in Germany,
for external counsel, it is possible that confidentiality obligations may cover the provision of
business and financial advice. See Shehata, supra note 9; Ibrahim Shehata, The Standard of
Attorney-Client Privilege in InternationalArbitration:Is the "Most Protective Law" the Right
Answer?,
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG
(May
18,
2018),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/05/18/standard-attorney-client-privilegeinternational-arbitration-protective-law-right-answer/ [https://perma.cc/6VJ4-VSDF]; see also
Ashley N. Ramnm, Comment, It's the End of Privilege as We Know It, and I [Don't] Feel Fine:
The Deteriorationof the CorporateAttorney-ClientPrivilege and Work ProductProtectionin the
European Union, United Kingdom, and Germany, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (2018)
(suggesting that in-house counsel may be capable of securing legal professional privilege in
certain circumstances).
19. Audley Sheppard, The Approach of Investment Treaty Tribunals to Evidentiary
Privileges,31 ICSID REv. 670, 680 (2016); Kuitkowski, supra note 8, at 72.
20. See Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 21 (identifying a
privilege in cases pending before the European Commission but limiting the privilege to
communications with an external lawyer and only for a right of defense related to litigation); Case
C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. & Akcros Chems. Ltd. v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. 1-8380 to I8381,
40-41 (reaffirming a privilege but limiting it to communications connected to "the
client's rights of defense"); see also MOCKESCH, supra note 13, at 95-108 (analyzing the German
approach to attorney-client privilege); ROGERS, supra note 13, at 124-25 (discussing civil law
variations).
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obligations that need not neatly match and, more likely, inject confusion and
unpredictability.
Yet, as a geographical and doctrinal "half-way house," international
arbitration must mediate between competing-but materially differentapproaches to confidentiality obligations deriving from the goal of
facilitating the attorney-client relationship. The transnational nature of
international commercial and investment activities means that parties,
counsel, and arbitrators likely come to the same arbitration with different
expectations-whether from a common, civil, Islamic, or transnational law
approach-about how to resolve privilege questions and document disputes.
As a result, in highly complex international arbitration proceedings, the laws
of multiple jurisdictions with different approaches, institutional rules,
international law, soft law, and tribunal discretion all come to the fore in
attempting to resolve something as practical, basic, and potentially expensive
as conflicts about the communications and documents subject to disclosure.
In order to provide guidance to parties and international arbitrators about
how best to resolve privilege determinations, this Essay explores the
boundaries of privilege determinations by focusing on a critical-and underanalyzed-element related to privilege assessments, namely: identification of
the applicable law that can be used to provide guidance and to enhance
predictability. It first explores the challenge of identifying applicable law and
the potential value of invoking a conflict of laws approach to analyzing the
issues. Second, the Essay explores the straightforward conflicts approach
about how to provide a rule of decision for privilege issues, namely in parties'
choice either by express agreement or implied agreement from institutional
rules. Third, it analyzes various national arbitration laws to explore how they
may either provide guidance of conflicts-of-law rules or other rules of
decisions to resolve privilege issues in international arbitration. Fourth, the
Essay explores the International Bar Association (IBA) Rules on evidence,
as the most precise exploration and the only soft-law instrument offering
tribunals and parties some guidance about the resolution of privilege disputes.
Fifth, it explores publicly available case law-both in investment treaty
arbitration (ITA) and international commercial arbitration (ICA)-to identify
how tribunals resolve privilege claims using the applicable legal framework.
As the present reality means that privilege issues function as the "wild
west" of international arbitration, this Essay concludes that, whenever
possible, parties should identify ex ante the rules applicable to legal privilege,
or at a minimum, provide more express legal rules to guide tribunals about
the conflicts of law methodology they must employ to identify the applicable
law. The ultimate objective should be to enable, with some degree of
certainty, identification of the law applicable to one of the most fundamental
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legal relationships, both to enable parties to conduct their professional
relationship in accordance with the applicable legal duties and to aid tribunals
in carrying out their mandate in isolating the applicable law in a rational,
predictable, and legitimate manner.
In the absence of party agreement, this Essay proposes that countrieseither in national law or treaties-identify self-determined guidelines or
adopt pre-existing guidelines, such as those in the IBA Rules on the Taking
of Evidence or rules of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution, to
guide tribunals and to reduce unpredictability by providing a meaningful
opportunity to capture tribunal discretion and prevent party manipulation.
Alternatively, to fill the void from lack of agreement or hard law guidance
from states, this Essay advocates for tribunals adopting an approach similar
to that championed by the conflict of laws luminary, Judge Robert Leflar. 2'
Using a Leflar-like approach that rejects an artificial dichotomy between
substance and procedure2 2 and offers clear, pre-articulated "choice
influencing considerations"23 that permits tribunals to identify the applicable
21. See, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977). For a general
discussion of Leflar's contribution to conflicts law, see Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Dedication to
RobertA. Leflar, 25 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1971); Symposium: Leflar on Conflicts, 31 S.C. L. REv. 409,
409-67 (1980); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Tribute to Robert A. Leflar, 50 ARK. L. REv. 407,
408 (1997) (discussing Leflar's contribution to conflict of laws); Sagi Peari, Better Law as a
Better Outcome, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 155, 163-66 (2015) (discussing Leflar's importance); Ralph
U. Whitten, Improving the "BetterLaw "System: Some Impudent Suggestionsfor Reorderingand
Reformulating Leflar's Choice-InfluencingConsiderations,52 ARK. L. REv. 177, 177-78 (1999)
("Leflar was a pioneer in the development of modem conflicts law"); Henry Woods, A Tribute
[The Eulogy at Robert A. Leflar's Funeral], 50 ARK. L. REv. 445, 446 (1997) (' [Leflar] became
the principal architect of the modern theory of conflict of laws. By the middle of this century, he
had become the preeminent authority in the world on the law of conflict of laws.").
22. Judge Leflar both recognized that the characterization of issues as either substantive or
procedural was often both a false dichotomy and a tool for manipulation. He therefore rejected
the use of this distinction and instead integrated the functional concerns underlying procedural
determinations into his primary methodology, thereby permitting a functional analysis using preidentified factors to facilitate proper advocacy and predictable outcomes. See, e.g., LEFLAR, supra
note 21, at 240; Laura Cooper, Statutes of Limitations in Minnesota Choice of Law: The
ProblematicReturn of the Substance-ProcedureDistinction, 71 MINN. L. REv. 363, 370-74
(1986); Robert L. Felix, Leflar in the Courts: Judicial Adoptions of Choice-Influencing
Considerations,52 ARK. L. REv. 35, 42-43 (1999).
23. Robert Leflar, having sat on the U.S. bench for multiple years, devised a choice of law
methodology that requires the adjudicators who are identifying the law applicable to an issue to
consider the factors of: predictability, interstate and international order, the simplification of the
judicial task, the forum's governmental interest, and the better law that does justice in the
individual case. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law,
41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations];Robert A.
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-InfluencingConsiderations,54 CAL. L. REv. 1584 (1966)
[hereinafter Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations]; see Robert A. Leflar
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law of privilege in an honest and rule-of-law based manner enables
stakeholders to advocate in a functional, effective, coherent, predictable, and
legitimate manner. At a minimum, shifting the question from "what law
applies" to the specific query of "what is the process for selecting the
applicable law" injects clarity and enhanced predictability into a fundamental
question of dispute resolution; and the shift in focus is preferable to the
current void. Guiding adjudicative decision-making using pathways provided
by ex ante factors both avoids leaving a fundamental legal question to
unbridled discretion-which may generate disquiet among international
arbitration stakeholders, including clients, lawyers, and arbitrators-and
offers a more predictable system based upon rule of law values that
nevertheless maintains a degree of flexibility for addressing individual issues
in specific cases.
I.

IN SEARCH OF APPLICABLE LAW

Privilege claims often arise in international arbitration. Tribunals
attempting to resolve those issues, however, face a complicated and
confusing challenge that could create variable-rather than predictableoutcomes. Meanwhile, parties and their counsel are left in the challenging
position of attempting to manage their expectations and resources about what
is protected and what may become part of the record, potentially entering the
public domain.24 The creation, existence, and scope of privilege is a matter of
Symposium on Conflict ofLaws, 52 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1999) (containing multiple articles reflecting
on the "better law" approach to choice of law advocated by the former judge, Professor Robert
A. Leflar). Leflar's approach was championed by noted comparative law scholar Konrad Zweigert
and private international law scholar Friedrich K. Juenger. Friedrich K. Juenger, Leflar's
Contributions to American Conflicts Law, 34 ARK. L. REv. 205, 206 (1980); Konrad Zweigert,
Some Reflections on the SociologicalDimensions of PrivateInternationalLaw or What Is Justice
in Conflict of Laws?, 44 U. COL. L. REv. 283, 283-99 (1973); see also Peari, supra note 21, at
163-70. But see Giesela Riil, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic
Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 801, 826-28 (2006) (suggesting Leflar's limited influence
outside of some U.S. states); Amos Shapira, "GraspAll,Lose All": On Restraint andModeration
in the Reformulation of Choice ofLaw Policy, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 248,252-53 (1977) (identifying
strengths and weaknesses of Leflar's approach).
24. While international arbitration was historically lauded for confidentiality, that is not
necessarily always the case. In ITA, there are new transparency norms imported into a variety of
treaties, particularly due to the adoption of the Mauritius Convention on Transparency. G.A. Res.
68/109, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (July, 30,
2013),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rule s-on-transparency/Rules-onTransparency-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y935-YWJV]; G.A. Res. 69/116, United Nations
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Dec. 10, 2014),
A/RES/69/116,
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-
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law;25 and the disclosure of communications and documents in an
international arbitration holds a risk of downstream consequences, namely
the production of confidential information in arbitration that could result in a
privilege waiver. Unlike other legal questions-whether adjudicators strive
to provide a clear, reliable, coherent, and determinate answer using applicable
law-one interpretation might be that international arbitration seems less
capable of or interested in resolving privilege questions as a function of
applicable law. Yet, some scholars have theorized how legal privilege should
be addressed in the transnational context.26
At present, there are no uniform rules on how to treat, identify, and apply
privilege in international arbitration.27 Likewise, there are not predictable
conflict of law rules for assessing privilege in international arbitration.
Institutional rules, for example, typically lack cogent rules for identifying the
applicable law ex ante.28 In the absence of party choice, the standard approach
convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf [https://penna.cc/L58W-AAU4]. Meanwhile, in the
national arbitration law of various states, there is a presumption against confidentiality, even in
the commercial arbitration context. Compare Esso/BHP v. Plowman (1995) 128 A.L.R. 391
(Austi.) (holding that arbitrations in Australia are not confidential unless the parties so specify),
with Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1999] 1 WLR 314 (Eng.) (determining that England
has an implied duty of confidentiality). This underpins the seriousness of deciding privilege
issues, as information confidential under one law could nevertheless become part of the public
domain and possibly subject to waiver.
25. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 8, at 2377 ("[I]ssues of privilege in international arbitration
have generally been resolved, in the first instance, by reference to generally -applicable rules of
privilege under national law. Virtually every developed jurisdiction provides for evidentiary
privileges in some fashion, which entitle parties to withhold documents and/or testimony from
disclosure in civil (and other) proceedings. These substantive rules of privilege provide the
starting point for development of rules of privilege in international arbitration ....
");MOCKESCH,
supra note 13, at 1-4, 6-7 (noting the basis of privilege comes from national law and noting that
"discrepancies in national attorney-client privilege law" likely creates "different expectations as
to the applicable privilege standard, which are influenced by [stakeholder] experience in domestic
litigation").
26. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 8, at 2383-86; Henri C. Alvarez, Evidentiary Privileges in
InternationalArbitration, in 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006:
BACK TO BASICS? 663, 683-86 (Albert Jan Van den Berg ed., 2007); Javier H. Rubinstein &
Britton B. Guerrina, The Attorney-ClientPrivilege and InternationalArbitration,18 J. INT'L ARB.
587, 596-601 (2001). Students and practitioners have waded into the fray to offer their own
recommendations. See, e.g., Jennifer Kirby, Evolution and the Discoverability of In-House
Counsel Communications,35 J. INT'L AB.147, 147-50, 153-54 (2018); Kuitkowski, supra note
8, at 90-98; Reiser, supra note 10; Shehata, supra note 9; Tevendale & Cartwright-Finch, supra
note 17, at 829-34; see also Ramim, supra note 18 (arguing about standards for the law applicable
to privilege in transnational internal investigations).
27. See infra Sections III-V.
28. In theory, there are two different ways to approach identifying the applicable law in
international arbitration. Using voie directe, tribunals choose the applicable law without delving
into a conflict of law analysis and instead are guided by what they believe is "appropriate." A
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largely leaves identifying the applicable law-including issues like the
substantive law2 9 applicable to privilege-to the subjective discretion of each
tribunal, which assesses what is "appropriate" without further guidance.30
second method, vole indirecte, involves tribunals focusing on a conflict of law analysis to explain
their reasoning, whether by reference to conflicts-related principals from a state (such as the legal
place of arbitration) or other reasoning. Compare MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 76-78 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing the
two methodologies but asserting that vole directe is dominant), with MOCKESCH, supra note 13,
at 195 (discussing the conflicts methods but suggesting vole indirecte is dominant). See also
Shehata, supra note 9, at 368 (discussing the two methods). One commentator suggests,
irrespective of methodology, the result is likely to be the same, and tribunals should in any event
provide reasons for their assessment. Doug Jones, The Substantive Rights of Parties in
Arbitration: Voie Directe and Voie Indirecte, in JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY AND CHOICE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 18.02 (Neil Kaplan & Michael J. Moser eds., 2016); see
also NIEK PETERS, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 99-100

(2017).
29. This Essay treats the law of privilege as a substantive matter, as it impacts the scope of
evidence presented to prove a claim or defense, can be outcome determinative, has a substantive
impact on party conduct, and is not a pure mechanical or housekeeping matter. See Corina Gugler
& Karina Goldberg, Privilege and Document Production in InternationalArbitration:How Do
Arbitrators Deal with Different Legal Systems' Approaches?, 14 REVISTA BRASILERA DE

ARBITRAGEM 63 (2017) (Braz.) (suggesting that the law applicable to privilege is a substantive
issue in most civil law jurisdictions); Reiser, supra note 10, at 60-62 (noting the problematic
substance-procedure distinction and "often the question is answered by saying it is both
procedural and substantive"); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the
artificial nature of the substance procedure dichotomy); Kuitkowski, supra note 8, at 82-85
(discussing substance and procedure issues related to privilege in different legal regimes);
Shehata, supra note 9, at 391 (noting the variation in whether jurisdictions treat attorney-client
privilege as substantive or procedural). But see Graham C. Lilly & Molly Bishop Shadel, When
PrivilegeFails:InterstateLitigation and the Erosion ofPrivilegeLaw, 66 ARK. L. REv. 613, 61517 (2013) (observing that some U.S. courts identify privilege as procedural and some as
substantive and conducting a review of how different U.S. states use conflicts methodology to
resolve privilege issues); Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 345 (suggesting that "[e]videntiary
rules are usually viewed as procedural in character" but acknowledging that privileges may be
different, as they "exist to protect certain interests or relationships and thereby to advance goals
of social and public policy" which can be "more important than the value of the evidence").
Characterization of issues as procedural or substantive is a perennial problem in conflict of laws
analysis. See, e.g., LEFLAR, supra note 21, at 126-27; EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J.

BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.8, at 128 (4th ed. 2004) ("The
distinction between 'substance' and 'procedure' has medieval origins: a court will apply foreign
law only to the extent that it deals with the substance of the case, i.e., affects the outcome of the
litigation, but will rely on forum law to deal with the 'procedural' aspects."); Edgar H. Ailes,
Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. REv. 392, 408 (1941); Walter
Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 34245 (1933); Walter Wheeler Cook, 'Characterization'in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE L.J. 191,
197 (1941); H.L. McClintock, DistinguishingSubstance and Procedure in the Conflict ofLaws,
78 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 947-49 (1930).
30.

See, e.g., ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 21(1) (INT'L CHAMBER OF CoM. 2017),

https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/0 1/ICC-20 17-Arbitration-and-20 14-Mediation-
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The vacuum is not unique. There is minimal evidence that parties
expressly address the applicable law for privilege (or rules for determining
privilege) in arbitration agreements. 3' Several national laws are also silent on
how to address privilege in international arbitration.3 2 In the absence of firm
legal guidance from parties, institutions, or national law, arbitrators have
been left in a void with their discretion and intuition as primary guides. The
inherent variance generates a situation where the resolution of critical
privilege questions is far from predictable. Given the difficulty in prescribing
precise ex ante rules for the wide breadth of international disputes, a degree
of flexibility on evidence and privilege issues seems somewhat reasonable.
Yet, failing to provide a rule-based solution to rule of law questions of legal
privilege, means that there is room for improvement in addressing privilege
questions in international arbitration. There are undoubtedly challenges in
resolving privilege matters; and perhaps a one-size-fits-all solution is both an
unlikely and impractical goal for international arbitration disputes, which are
heterogeneous and multi-variate. Nevertheless, providing more predictable
and clear paradigms for assessing privilege promotes the net value of
international arbitration and its capacity to provide predictable, reasoned, and
coherent dispute resolution.
Rules-english-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GYT-U8VD] (last visited Sep. 7, 2019) ("The
parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal to the
merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the
rules of law which it determines to be appropriate."); ICDR InternationalArbitration Rules, in
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES art. 31.1 (INT'L CTR. FOR DIsP. RESOL.

2014),

https://www.icdr.org/sites/default/files/document repository/ICDR Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VZT-ARAV] (last visited Sep. 7, 2019) ("Failing such an agreement by the
parties [on the applicable law], the tribunal shall apply such law(s) or rules of law as it determines

to be appropriate."); LCIA

ARBITRATION RULES,

art. 22.3

(LONDON CT. OF INT'L ARB.

2014), http://www.lcia.org/Dispute Resolution Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RH32-AWXS] (last visited Sep. 7, 2019) ("If and to the extent that the Arbitral
Tribunal decides that the parties have made no such choice [of the applicable law], the Arbitral
Tribunal shall apply the law(s) or rules of law which it considers appropriate."); ARBITRATION
RULES

art.

27(1)

(ARB.

INST.

STOCKHOLM

CHAMBER

OF

CoM.

2017),

https://sccinstitute.com/media/293614/arbitration ruleseng_ 17 web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z64Z-GM3X] (last visited Sep. 7, 2019) ("In the absence of such agreement [by
the parties about applicable law], the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the law or rules of law that it
considers most appropriate."); see also CHINA INT'L ECON. AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMM'N

(CIETAC)

ARBITRATION RULES, art.

49(2)

(CHINA INT'L EcoN. & TRADE ARB. COMM'N 2015),

http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id= 106&l=en
[https://perma.cc/BS8JWJSE] (last visited Sep. 7, 2019) ("In the absence of such an agreement [of the parties on the
applicable law] or where such agreement is in conflict with a mandatory provision of the law, the
arbitral tribunal shall determine the law applicable to the merits of the dispute."); infra notes 6263 and accompanying text (identifying the broad discretion to tribunals under the Singapore
International Arbitration Rules to identify applicable law).
31. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Section III.
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Choice of law issues are a perennial challenge in international arbitration.
Yet any dispute involving multi-jurisdictional actors and facts inevitably
faces the specter of how best to resolve issues of applicable law. Even
domestically, United States' courts have struggled to identify what privilege
applies to multi-jurisdictional disputes, particularly attorney-client privilege.
Wellin v. Wellin33 offers a textbook example of how adjudicators could use
conflicts to identify what law applies. The case involved a New York-based
client that both called and emailed to seek advice from a South Carolina
lawyer about South Carolina trust litigation that devolved from her
grandfather's New York estate. To resolve the dispute about the scope and
application of attorney-client privilege, the court used conflicts to explore
which law should dictate privilege determinations. Focusing on South
Carolina's conflicts rules,3 4 the federal court used conflicts principlesnamely the Restatement of Conflicts (Second)-to determine which
35
jurisdiction had the "most significant relationship" with the legal privilege.
Using that methodology, the court concluded South Carolina law provided
the substantive rule of law providing for the scope and application of the
privilege,3 6 and used that legal standard to assess attorney-client privilege.
Other courts have taken similar approaches. In Wultz v. Bank of China,the
court required a conflict of laws assessment to identify the applicable law.
The court's analysis used a unique New York conflicts test to determine that
Chinese law applied, and as documents produced by the Bank of China in
China were not privileged under Chinese law, those documents were
discoverable in U.S. litigation.3 7 Likewise, in Veleron Holding v. BNP
33.
2017).
34.

211 F. Supp. 3d 793 (D.S.C. 2016), clarified by 2017 WL 3620061 (D.S.C. Aug. 23,
As a result of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the court first noted that the availability of

an evidentiary privilege is based upon the choice of law rules of the forum state. Id. at 800-0 1.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 803-06.
Id. at 805-06.
Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 979 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) analyzed the law

applicable to privilege in a claim under the U.S. Antiterrorism Act and a request for production
of documents involving the Bank of China. The court used an unusual conflicts test for
ascertaining the law applicable to privilege, namely the "touch base" test, which required the court
to consider the country that has the predominant or the most direct and compelling interest in
whether communications should remain confidential, unless that foreign law is contrary public
policy. Id. at 486, 489. Wultz said that one of two conflicts principles would form the basis of
ascertaining the applicable law, namely either "'the place where the allegedly privileged
relationship was entered into' or 'the place in which that relationship was centered at the time the
communication was sent."' Id. at 486. Noting that China was where the communications and
documents were produced and that Chinese law neither provided for an attorney-client privilege
nor for a work product justification to avoid document production, the court held there was no
basis to prevent disclosure of documents produced by the Bank of China in U.S. litigation. Id. at
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Paribas, the court held documents were not privileged and improperly
withheld from U.S. discovery. In that case, the documents involving Russian
attorneys were unprotected by Russian law (which did not protect attorneyclient privilege or work-product by inside counsel) and materials involving
Dutch lawyers were not protected by Dutch law (which did not provide
attorney-client privilege to unlicensed lawyers).38 While other courts,
whether in the United States3 9 or a foreign country,40 may take different
approaches to identify the applicable law, focusing on conflicts principles
seems sensible, as choice of law principles can and should form the
organizing principle to dictate the legal implications of a legal privilege.
To this end, the remainder of this Essay explores where-if at all-there
is legal guidance on the conflict of laws principles that should guide an
arbitration tribunal's choice of law assessments to drive the resolution of
privilege disputes. In theory, multiple sources-contained in hard and soft
law-could provide guidance about choice of law methods for resolving
privilege issues. Given the current pernicious legal void, the subsequent
sections address how different legal norms and standards could fill the gap to
enhance the predictability of privilege assessments and to aid the legitimacy
of international arbitration.

488-89, 490, 491-92. In a subsequent reconsideration decision, the court clarified that,
"American privilege law applies to all communications that properly 'touch base' with U.S. legal
matters, even if those matters are unrelated to the present litigation." Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd.,
No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 WL 6098484, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 20, 2013).
38. Veleron Holding, B.V. v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 12-CV-5966 (CM)(RLE), 2014 WL
4184806, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2014).
39. A Delaware bankruptcy court purported to conduct a conflict of laws analysis to
determine whether U.S. or Canadian law had the most significant connection to the case to
determine the applicable privilege law. Despite the fact that the party involved was Canadian and
documents were prepared by outside and inside counsel at request of Canadian corporation for
use in Canada, the court nevertheless held that Delaware law applied. Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp.
v. BCE Inc., 392 B.R. 561, 595-96 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
40. In England and Wales, leaving aside European law in light of Brexit, the courts'
common law conflicts methodology has often involved an assessment of the "proper law." See,
e.g., LAWRENCE COLLINS, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
394-96 (1994); PETER NORTH, ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-67, 73-75 (1993);
Julius Stone, A Court of Appeal in Search ofItself: Thoughts on Judges' Liberation, 71 COLUM.
L. REv. 1420, 1424-27, 1432-35 (1971); Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing
Defamation Law in the European Union, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 963 n. 182 (1996). Nevertheless,
on issues of privilege, the English High Court held that, irrespective of whether transnational
issues are involved, English privilege rules should apply, thereby treating the matter as procedural
and requiring the application of lexfori (i.e., the law of the forum). RBS Rights Issue Litigation
[2016] EWHC (Ch) 3161 [131]-[34], [170]-[77] (Eng.); see also MOCKESCH, supra note 13, at
196 (noting how different national courts treat privilege as a procedural issue and apply lexfori).
But see supra note 22 and accompanying text (observing how the procedure-substance distinction
is artificial and subject to manipulation).
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CHOICE OF LAW GUIDANCE: EXPRESS PARTY CHOICE AND IMPLIED
CHOICE FROM INSTITUTIONAL RULES

In theory, parties can resolve core choice of law issues expressly by
providing tribunals with clear guidance about the law that should govern their
privilege determinations. Choice of law in international arbitration, however,
is complex. Simply including a general choice of law provision in a contract
for the substantive law for disputes involving the contract need not dictate the
law applicable to privilege. Likewise, choosing the seat of arbitration does
not necessarily expressly dictate that privilege issues will be determined
using the law of the seat,4 particularly for cases arising under the ICSID
Convention when there is no legal "seat" of arbitration. For general
provisions in investment or commercial contracts, which parties craft, the
failure to precisely address what law governs privilege (or the standards by
which privilege issues will be evaluated) injects ambiguity into tribunals'
resolution of privilege disputes.4 2
Parties' freedom to agree on procedure, however, gives them the right to
define the law applicable to privilege claims or scope of attorney-client
privilege. The initial place to consider an express party agreement is while
drafting the dispute resolution clause. Admittedly, minds may be focused
upon the larger commercial and legal particulars of the transaction, with the
applicable privilege law in subsequent disputes unlikely to garner much
attention. Yet, by failing to address the matter early, parties lose the
opportunity to provide an ex ante contractual solution to privilege disputes.
A later arising agreement (i.e., a submission agreement) could provide
contractual solution to privilege that permits parties to tailor privilege rules
to their unique concerns or avoid unfair surprise; unfortunately, such
subsequent agreements may prove challenging as a practical matter, as once
a dispute arises, embedded interests, hostilities, and tactical positioning may
prevent agreement. Even the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines
for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses consider the attorney-client
41. See, e.g., JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 132-35 (1978); Ondfej Chvosta, The Potentially Applicable Systems of Law in
Commercial and Investment Arbitrations:A Comparative Perspective, 22 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L
L. & DisP. RESOL. 1, 2-16 (2014); Michael Pryles, Choice of Law Issues in International
Arbitration,63 ARB. 200 (1997); Jessica Thrope, Comment, A Question ofIntent: Choice ofLaw
and the InternationalArbitrationAgreement, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 16, 19-20 (1999); see also supra
note 29 (identifying that privilege need not necessarily be a procedural issue and treating, for the

purposes of this Essay, privilege as a substantive matter).
42. One strategic place where parties could impliedly agree to rules for addressing privilege
would involve express incorporation of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration into an arbitration agreement or submission agreement. These IBA Rules are

discussed in Sections IV and V(B).
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privilege as a secondary element of drafting arbitration agreements.43 The
TBA recommends including principles to govern privilege only "when, in the
rare instance, contracting parties can foresee at the contract drafting stage that
issues of privilege may arise and be of consequence,"4 4 and fails to
recommend any standards to use in drafting arbitration clauses. As a partial
solution, parties could consider expressly incorporating pre-articulated
standards, including the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
45
Arbitration.
While the most straightforward clarification would be an express party
choice, there is little evidence that this is the solution that parties typically
adopt. 46 It is standard, however, for parties to expressly adopt the arbitration
rules of established international arbitration institutions or the ad hoc rules
47
from the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL).
To the extent that these arbitration rules then become implied terms to the
parties' agreement or otherwise stand as the rules of decision on evidentiary
matters, these rules could provide express guidance as to how to resolve
problems related to privilege.
Unfortunately, few institutional arbitration rules ever mention privilege,
largely granting the arbitral tribunal with broad discretion to decide what
information should be protected and to which degree. The breadth of
discretion and lack of clarity means parties are left unable to determine ex
ante which privilege rules will be applied.

43.

INT'L BAR

Ass'N,

GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CLAUSES

30-31
(Oct. 7,
2010), https://www.ibanet.org/ENewsArchive/IBA_27October_2010
-Arbitration Clauses Guidelines.aspx [https ://penna.cc/XG7N-DPGS].
44. Id. 57.
45. Id. 59 ("The following clause can be used if the parties wish to specify the principles
that will govern issues of privilege with respect to document disclosure: All contentions that a
document or communication is privileged and, as such, exempt from production in the arbitration,
shall be resolved by the arbitral tribunal in accordance with Article 9 of the IBA Rules on the
Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration."); see also SOURGENS, DUGGAL & LAIRD, supra
note 15 (discussing how the IBA Rules can affect privilege determinations); infra Section IV
(discussing the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence).
46. Ruth Cowley & Yasmin Lilley, Conflict of Privilege Rules in InternationalArbitration,
INT'L ARB. REP. 30 (2016), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/-/media/files/nrf/nrfweb/
imported/international-arbitration-report---issue-7.pdfla=en&revision=2b95e882-b426-4aal952e-6270bebf896b [perma.cc/ZM23-NZKY].
47. See LATHAM & WATKINS, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 12 (2017),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/guide-to-international-arbitration-2017 [https://perma.cc/
2F7F-R4WH].
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In an analysis of eighty-eight different international and regional
arbitration rules,48 86% (n = 76) of the rules analyzed were utterly silent on
the issue of privilege and determining the law applicable to privilege.4 9
By and large, for the massive cohort of institutions that failed to expressly
address issues of privilege generally (let alone choice of law rules applicable
to the privilege determination), the rules simply granted tribunals wide
discretion to establish facts of the case and to determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality, and weight of any evidence. The rules did not address
how tribunals should determine issues of evidence, such as admissibility,
withholding of documents, or privilege. Many of the institutions that have
taken this approach are market leaders in international dispute settlement.50
48. This Essay's analysis of institutions and arbitration rules was initially conducted in
August 2017 by Mariya Myroshnychenko and the author. The rules analyzed were the rules in
force and effect at that time. Rules cited in this essay for their precise textual content were crosschecked for updates and are cited accordingly.
49.

See, e.g., RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (INT'L CTR. FOR

OF
INV.
DISPUTES
2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ICSID/
ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF.htm [https://perma.cc/NE3G-MZ7P] (there are no rules on
privilege in the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings).
50. The institutions surveyed included: the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
UNCITRAL, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), American
Arbitration Association (AAA), International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce (SCC), London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), ADR Institute
of Canada, World Intellectual Property Organization, Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(SIAC), Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), JAMS, Saudi Center for
Commercial Arbitration, Dubai International Arbitration Centre, Abu Dhabi Commercial
Conciliation and Arbitration Center, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce & Sectoral
Associations, Albanian Commercial Mediation and Arbitration Center, Oslo Chamber of
Commerce, Arbitration and Mediation Centre of Paris, Arbitration Association of the Republic
of China, Arbitration Center of the American Chamber of Commerce Sao Paulo, Arbitration
Centre of Mexico, Arbitration Centre of the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Arbitration Court attached to the Economic Chamber of the Czech Republic and to the
Agricultural Chamber of the Czech Republic, Court of Arbitration at the Bulgarian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, Arbitration Court of the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa (2015 Rules), Arbitration Foundation of Southern
Africa (2017 International), Arbitration Institute of the Finland Chamber of Commerce
Association of Maritime Arbitrators of Canada, Australian Centre for International Commercial
Arbitration, Association of Arbitrators (Southern Africa), Beijing Arbitration Commission,
British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre, Cairo Regional Center for
International Commercial Arbitration, Cdmara de Arbitragem Empresarial Brasil (CAMARB),
Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada, Belgian Centre for Arbitration and Mediation, Swiss
Chambers' Arbitration Institution, Chamber of Arbitration of Milan, Santiago Arbitration and
Mediation Center, Centro de Mediaci6n y Arbitraje Comercial de la Cimara Argentina de
Comercio, International Center for Conciliation and Arbitration in Costa Rica, Court of
Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of Commerce, Permanent Court of Arbitration, European Court
of Arbitration, Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Court of Arbitration, Council for
SETTLEMENT
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For example, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 5 1 the London
Court of International Arbitration (LCIA),52 the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC), 53 the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre

National and International Commercial Arbitration (India), Commercial Mediation and
Arbitration Commission of the Mexico City National Chamber of Commerce, Commercial
Arbitration and Mediation Center for the Americas, China Maritime Arbitration Commission,
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Chicago International Dispute
Resolution Association, Franco-Arab Chamber of Commerce, Court of Innovative Arbitration,
Cyprus Arbitration and Mediation Centre, Cyprus Eurasia Dispute Resolution and Arbitration
Center, Court of Arbitration attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Delhi
High Court Arbitration Centre, German Institution of Arbitration, Dubai International Financial
Centre Arbitration Centre, International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Ukrainian Chamber
of Commerce, International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of the Russian Federation, Indian Council of Arbitration, Indian Institute of Arbitration
and Mediation, Indonesian National Board of Arbitration, Institute for the Development of
Commercial Law and Practice Arbitration Centre (Sri Lanka), Institute of Arbitrators and
Mediators Australia, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission, Korean Commercial
Arbitration Board, Kazakhstani International Arbitrage, Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association, Italian Arbitration Association, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Center,
Istanbul Arbitration Centre, Vienna International Arbitral Centre, Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration (The Lagos Centre), Qatar International Arbitration and
Conciliation Center, Permanent Court of Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Slovenia, Permanent Arbitration Court at the Croatian Chamber of Commerce,
International Arbitration Chamber of Paris, Netherlands Arbitration Institute, National
Commercial Arbitration Centre of Cambodia, Malta Arbitration Centre, Shenzhen Court of
International Arbitration, Singapore Institute of Arbitrators, Vietnam International Arbitration
Centre at the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the International Institute for
Conflict Prevention and Resolution.
51. See ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION arts. 22, 25 (INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 2017),
https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/0 1/ICC-20 17-Arbitration-and-20 14-MediationRules-english-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BG9-8NJQ]; see also id. at app. IV (providing
examples of case management techniques relating to evidence).
52. See LCIA ARBITRATION RULES art. 22.1(vi) (LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION
2014), http://www.lcia.org/Dispute Resolution Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/KD99-Q7WC] (granting tribunals authority "to decide whether or not to apply any
strict rules of evidence (or any other rules) as to the admissibility, relevance or weight of any
material tendered by a party on any issue of fact or expert opinion; and to decide the time, manner
and form in which such material should be exchanged between the parties and presented to the
Arbitral Tribunal").
53. See SCC ARBITRATION RULES art. 3 1(1) (STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 2017),
https://sccinstitute.com/media/293614/arbitration ruleseng_ 17 web.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFJ
5-WB8Y] ("The admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence shall be for the
Arbitral Tribunal to determine.").
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(HKIAC), 54 the Swiss Chambers' Arbitration Institution, 55 the Cairo Regional

Center for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), 56 and the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) 57 all
followed this "pure discretion" model. Likewise, the 2010 UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules failed to address privilege, instead only generally granting
tribunals authority to determine the admissibility and weight of the evidence
offered.58 Interestingly, the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) historically had no rules that expressly
addressed privilege issues; 59 and although ICSID is in the midst of a massive
revision project,60 ICSID has not made a material shift in its approach or used

54.

The rules surveyed originally were the 2013 HKIAC Rules. See 2013 ADMINISTERED
RULES
art.
22.2-.3
(H.K. INT'L
ARBITRATION
CTR.
2013),

ARBITRATION

https://www.hkiac.org/sites/default/files/ck filebrowser/PDF/arbitration/2013_hkiac rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YR8-4UBP] ("The arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence, including whether to apply strict rules of
evidence ....
The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to admit or exclude any documents,
exhibits or other evidence."). The 2018 HKIAC rules on point are identical. See 2018
ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULES art. 22.2-.3 (H.K. INT'L ARBITRATION CTR. 2018),
https://www.hkiac.org/sites/default/files/ck-filebrowser/PDF/arbitration/2018 hkiacrules.pdf
[https ://perma.cc/ENK2-J7KB].
55. See SWISS RULES OF INT'L ARBITRATION art. 24(2) (Swiss CHAMBERS ARBITRATION
INST.
2012),
https://www.swissarbitration.org/files/33/Swiss-Rules/SRIA EN 2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6NQ-SJKK] ("The arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence.").
56. See ARCICA ARBITRATION RULES art. 27(4) (CAIRO REG'L CTR. INT'L COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
2011),
http://crcica.org.eg/rules/arbitration/2011/cr arb rules en.pdf
[https://perna.cc/W4XF-YVE4] ("The arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence offered.").
57. See CIETAC ARBITRATION RULES arts. 41-43 (CHINA INT'L EcoN. AND TRADE
ARBITRATION
COMM'N
2015),
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id= 106&l=en
[https://perma.cc/98QYLM8S].
58. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 27(4) (U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW 2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/englisltexts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-ArbitrationRules-2013-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZAL-A3BK].
59. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS r. 34(1) (INT'L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT
OF
INV.
DISP.
2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/main-eng.htm
[https://perma.cc/36KK-FH5Z] ("The Tribunal shall be the judge of the admissibility of any
evidence adduced and of its probative value."); see also id. at rules 33-34.
60. ICSIDRules and RegulationsAmendment Process,INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments [https://perma.cc/6KP5-TDNK] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2019); see also Alexander G. Leventhal, The 2018 Proposalsfor Amendments of
the ICSID Rules: ICSID Enters the Era of Trump, Populism, and State Sovereignty, ASIL
INSIGHTS (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/15/2018-proposalsamendments-icsid-rules-icsid-enters-era-trump-populism [https://perma.cc/3WPM-L8LH].
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the opportunity to address how to identify to the law relevant to privilege
assessments, instead it relies upon tribunal discretion. 6'
There was a micro-trend of institutions taking a more direct, rather than
implicit approach, to privilege. Namely, about 10% (n = 9) of the analyzed
rules expressly required arbitrators to take privileges into account when
addressing issues of document production or exclusion. The Rules of the
Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC) are a good example of this
paradigm. Specifically, they provide an express mandate that empowers
tribunals to "determine any claim of legal or other privilege."6 2 Yet, in the
exercise of its mandate, tribunals are "not required to apply the rules of
evidence of any applicable law" in determining evidence admissibility.63 The
domestic arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)64
and the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS) similarly require
tribunals to "take into account applicable principles of legal privilege, such
as those involving the confidentiality of communications between a lawyer
and client."65 But both sets of rules lack guidance about how tribunals should
61. Under the ICSID rules amendment project, tribunals retain the general power to
determine admissibility and probative value of evidence without reference to any specific
standard or law; and there is no reference to the applicable law of privilege (or standards for
identifying such law) in connection with document production disputes, only a focus on scope
and timeliness of the request, relevance and materiality, burden of production, basis of the
objection, and other relevant circumstances. Proposalsfor Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Consolidated Rules, 35-36 (Int'l Ctr. For Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Working Paper No. 2,
2019), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/VOL_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVV4-HMBL].
Three states, however, have identified concerns regarding the need to be more precise as regards
privilege and confidentiality. Although it failed to identify a procedure through which a tribunal
should make the final assessment, Canada requested that the rules permit parties to have "an
opportunity to provide reasoned objections to the request, including on the grounds that the
requested documents are protected from disclosure by applicable privileges and laws." INT'L CTR.
FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT-MEMBER STATE & PUBLIC
COMMENTS
ON
WORKING
PAPER
# 2 OF MARCH
15, 2019
104
(2019),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/compendium wp2.pdf
[https ://perma.cc/4G3UH3D2]. Australia made a general pronouncement suggesting "the rules should explicitly
recognize exemptions from production for various types of confidential information," which was
also an approach endorsed by Georgia. Id. at 103, 149.

62.

SIAC

ARBITRATION

RULES

r. 27(o)

(SING.

INT'L

ARBITRATION

CTR.

2016),

http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-rules-2016 [https://perma.cc/SM7J-YSMD].
63. Id. at r. 19.2. The SIAC Rules also provide broad discretion to arbitrators in ascertaining
the applicable law. See id. at r. 31.1 ("Failing such designation by the parties, the Tribunal shall
apply the law or rules of law which it determines to be appropriate.").
64. AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-34(c) (AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N 2013) https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%/ 2ORules.pdf
[https ://perma.cc/AFB8-VBN5].
65. JAMS INT'L ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES art. 25.4 (JAMS 2016),
https://www'jamsadr.com/international-arbitration-rules/english#Evidence
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identify and apply the applicable law governing the legal privilege.6 6
Ultimately, this second paradigm effectively amounts to a "pure discretion"
model for tribunals' privilege determinations, but at least it does so by
expressly acknowledging the latent problem and alerting parties that they
may wish to create enhanced certainty for privilege and confidentiality issues.
Ultimately, less than 5% (n = 4) of the institutional rules examined
provided clear guidance as to how to address the law applicable to privilege.
Those institutions exhibited wide variance in providing guidance as to how
tribunals might resolve issues of privilege conflicts in international

arbitration.
In a nod to the traditional lexfori6 7 rules of applying only the law of the
forum, one institution provided clear and predictable rules for identifying the
law applicable to privilege disputes. The Arbitration Foundation of Southern
Africa's Commercial Arbitration Rules,6 8 which can apply to both domestic
and international arbitration,69 expressly require tribunals to apply the South
African law of evidence. This mandate, imposing the rules of the forum,
means that the law of the South African forum necessarily governs
evidentiary issues, including privilege claims.7 While this lexfori rule is rigid

[https://penia.cc/282Z-FF6U]; see also AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION
R-34(c) (stating arbitrators "shall take into account applicable principles of legal
privilege, such as those involving the confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and
client" but failing to provide any guidance about how to exercise that mandate).
66. AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-34(b) ("The
arbitrator shall determine the admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered and
may exclude evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant."); see also JAMS
INT'L ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES art. 21.1 ("Subject to these rules, the Tribunal may
conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are
treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a reasonable
opportunity to present its case."); id. at art. 21.4 ("Unless the parties at any time agree otherwise
in writing, the Tribunal will have the power, on the application of any party or on its own motion,
to identify the issues and to ascertain the relevant facts and the law or rules of law applicable to
the arbitration, or to inquire into the merits of the parties' dispute.").
67. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori: Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L.
REv. 637 (1960).
68. See AFSA DOMESTIC ARBITRATION COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 15.3
(ARBITRATION
FOUND.
OF
S. AFR. 2015), http://www.arbitration.co.za/downloads/
AFSA Rules_2015 12 01.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAV4-FZ2S] ("The arbitrator shall apply the
South African law of evidence ....
").
69. On May 31, 2017, Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa created International
Rules for the Conduct of an Administered Arbitration that govern disputes which are international
in character. See id. at art. 15.2.1.
70. AFSA DOMESTIC ARBITRATION COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 68, at art. 15.3.
71. See id.
PROCEDURES
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and potentially creates unusual results,72 it has the benefit of offering
predictability and certainty to both parties and tribunals. It does, however, run
the risk that a dispute or parties otherwise unrelated to South Africa may find
that South African law has been unexpectedly imported to their professional
relationship or otherwise injected a degree of unfairness. 3 Perhaps this was
why, when the Foundation drafted supplementary rules to address
international arbitration, the new rules distanced itself from lexfori, taking
an approach with similarities to SIAC. While expressly identifying the issue
of privileged materials, the new rules granted tribunals discretion to exclude
documents from the proceedings that are "protected from disclosure by virtue
of legal impediment or privilege under the legal or ethical rules determined
by the Tribunal to be applicable."7 4 There was, however, unfortunately no
guidance in the new rules that provides certainty or clarity as to how tribunals
are to ascertain and apply that applicable law.75
One institution has functionally adopted the soft-law approach of the
TBA's Rules on the Taking of Evidence.7 6 In its 2016 rules revision, the
Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration incorporated a
reference to the TBA Rules into its own default rules.77 As discussed later, the
TBA Rules expressly address issues of privilege and provide a "factor
dependent" model for evaluating privilege issues, but without providing a
clear reliable baseline for tribunal decisions. Perhaps more importantly, the
implicit approach of the Australian rules on assessing privilege is somewhat
ambivalent, as the rules only state the tribunal: "shall have regard to, but is
not bound to apply, the [IBA] Rules on the Taking of Evidence."7 8 Put simply,
72. One might imagine a hypothetical dispute involving the South African Commercial
Arbitration rules that seeks the disclosure of documentation from U.S. counsel involving a U.S.
multinational and its involvement with separate Mexican and German entities, which had a
Mexican-German South African joint venture project. In a dispute about the disclosure of
documents from the U.S. counsel in connection matters relevant to the Mexican entity, it would
be somewhat surprising-perhaps to both the U.S. and Mexican entity-to apply South African
attorney-client privilege law.
73. See Kirby, supra note 26, at 151-53 (discussing fairness considerations when making
privilege determinations in international arbitration).
74. AFSA INT'L ARBITRATION RULES r. 30.4.1 (ARBITRATION FOUND. OF S. AFR.)
https://arbitration.co.za/international-arbitration/international-rules/
[https ://perma.cc/KH6K9Q4L]_(last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
75. For example, the most guidance the new rules provide is that, in the absence of an
express choice, "the Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it considers to be the most
appropriate." Id. at r. 38.1.
76. See infra Sections IV, V.B (discussing the IBA Rules).
77. See ACICA ARBITRATION RULES art. 31.2 (AUSTRALIAN CTR. FOR INT'L COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 2016), https://acica.org.au/wp-content/uploads/Rules/2016/ACICA-ArbitrationRules-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/39YD-VPCL].
78. Id.
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under the Australian experiment, there is no firm mandate to use the IBA
rules; and with no other express rule addressing privilege issues, broad
discretion and unfettered decision-making is left in the hands of tribunals.
The final paradigm for how arbitration institutions address privilege
involves the proverbial "race to the top." The Rules for the AAA's
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) do three core things.
First, they shine a spotlight on the fact that tribunals must take a careful
approach when addressing privilege issues by expressly making privilege an
area of specific focus.7 9 Second, the rules acknowledge that there may be
varying levels of protection across jurisdictions.80 Third, and most
importantly, the rules set a clear baseline for how to deal with that divergence
that requires equal treatment of all parties. 8 ' Namely, the ICDR Rules state
that: "[w]hen the parties, their counsel, or their documents would be subject
under applicable law to different rules, the tribunal should, to the extent
possible, apply the same rule to all parties, giving preference to the rule that
provides the highest level of protection."8 2
Yet, this approach-while providing instructive, predictable, and balanced
guidance as to which rules to follow-is arguably a statistical outlier. It
would be wrong to presume that an emotionally salient or "sticky" example
is representative of the whole.83 Only one other institution has adopted the
approach of the ICDR. Namely, the Rules of the Saudi Center for
Commercial Arbitration mirror the text of the ICDR privilege rules nearly
verbatim.84 As an empirical matter, given the existing caseload of institutions
such as the ICC, LCIA, SCC, and CIETAC-where there is no express
mention of privilege and nearly unfettered tribunal discretion-this is the

See ICDR InternationalArbitration
Rules, supra note 30, at art. 22.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., SUSAN D. FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 24, 25-56, 64, 337-38 (2019) (discussing cognitive illusions
and how sticky examples can disrupt perceptions and inject error into assessments).
84. The 2016 Saudi Rules were originally analyzed. SCCA 2016 ARBITRATION RULES art.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

22

(SAuDI

CTR. FOR

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION

2016), https://www.acerislaw.com/wp-

content/uploads/2018/01/Saudi-Center-for-Commercial-Arbitration-Rules.pdf
[https://perma.
cc/3N9T-C2SU]. The October 2018 version of the SCCA rules has retained the precise wording
of article twenty-two. SCCA 2018 ARBITRATION RULES art. 22 (SAUDI CTR. FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
2018),
https ://drive.google.com/file/d/100NLqTesQi0IBBBkaV00DU9
eTb8bFED_/view [https://perna.cc/HL4T-F33X].
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approach JCDR likely legally codified into a small fraction of the world's
international arbitration disputes.8 5

III.

CHOICE OF LAW GUIDANCE: STANDARDS FROM NATIONAL LAW

Much like the analysis of institutional rules, few national laws expressly
address the issue of legal privilege in international arbitration, let alone
provide guidance as to identifying the applicable law and its potential
application. Rather, much like the legal vacuum provided in institutional
rules, many arbitration laws grant arbitral tribunals the power to decide
procedural and evidentiary matters for themselves-but without providing
any guidance or standards that they should use in exercising their discretion
regarding privilege issues.
The UNCITRAL Model Law, which has been adopted by many countries,
takes this approach.8 6 Namely, the law suggests that, unless parties otherwise
agree, the tribunal has the power to determine admissibility, relevance,
materiality, and weight of any evidence.8 7 While this highlights the possible
opportunity of parties to make an express agreement, it nevertheless offers
unfettered discretion and no guidance to tribunals as to the best practices for
exercising their authority. Multiple civil law countries have tended to follow

85. Ironically, the "most protective privilege" approach has been applied by tribunals, even
where the standard was not part of the applicable arbitration rules. The two publicly available
decisions doing so have used standards in the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence. See, e.g.,
infra Section V.B. 1 (discussing the only two known cases, namely Blanco and Pogtovd banka,
where tribunals have used the "most protective privilege" standard to resolve privilege issues);
but see infra note 117 (noting one commentator suggested GEA v. Ukraine applied that standard
as well but observing the authority provided did not support the conclusion).
86. U.N. COMM. ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, at art. 19, U.N. Sales
No.
E.08.V.4
(2008),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/englisb/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/0786998 Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XXU-EF9H].
87. Id.
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this approach. French, 8 Swiss, 9 Canadian,9" Mexican, 9 ' Brazilian, 92 and
Chinese9 3 arbitration laws give arbitral tribunals wide discretion regarding
88.

B.

CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE

[C.P.C.]

[CIvIL PROCEDURE CODE] art.

BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT

1464 (Fr.);

GARY

146 (2d ed. 2015)

("Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall define the procedure to be

followed in the arbitration. It is under no obligation to abide by the rules governing court
proceedings.") (quoting art. 1464); id. at 147 ("The arbitral tribunal shall take all necessary steps
concerning evidentiary and procedural matters, unless the parties authorise it to delegate such
tasks to one of its members .... If a party is in possession of an item of evidence, the arbitral
tribunal may enjoin that party to produce it, determine the manner in which it is to be produced
and, if necessary, attach penalties to such injunction.") (quoting art. 1467).
89. SCHWEIZERISCHES BUNDESGESETZ OBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG]
[FEDERAL CODE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] Dec. 17, 1987, SR 291, art. 182 2 (Switz.)
("If the parties have not regulated the procedure, it shall be fixed, as necessary, by the arbitral
tribunal either directly or by reference to a law or rules of arbitration."); see also Bernhard F.
Meyer-Hauser & Philipp Sieber, Attorney Secrecy v Attorney-Client Privilege in International

Commercial Arbitration, 73 ARB. 148, 149-53 (2007) (discussing the attorney secrecy law of
Switzerland).
90. Canada Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 17 (2d Supp.), sched. 1, art. 19
("Subject to the provisions of this Code, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be
followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings. Failing such agreement, the
arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Code, conduct the arbitration in such manner
as it considers appropriate. The power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to
determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.").
91. C6digo de Comercio [CCom], art. 1435, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 07-101889, ultimas reformas DOF 02-05-2017 (Mex.) ("Subject to the provisions of this title, the
parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the
proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this
title, conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. The power conferred upon
the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and
weight of any evidence.").
92. Lei No. 9.307, de 23 de Setembro de 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
24.11.1996 (Braz.) art. 21 § 1 ("In the absence of any provisions on the procedure, the sole
arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal shall conduct the arbitration in such a manner it considers
appropriate.") (alterada pela Lei No. 13.129/15).
93. See Arbitration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct.
31, 1994) arts. 43-46 (China), http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article&a-show
&id=2415&l=en [https://perma.cc/EQ9Q-GZGQ] (failing to provide any mention of or
guidelines related to privilege and instead providing general rules about the provision of evidence
to substantiate claims and defenses); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text (identifying
the lack of attorney-client privilege and work product protection in China); Qifan Cui, Document
Production in Chinese Litigation and InternationalArbitration, 6 J. CAMBRIDGE STUD. 69, 74
(2011),
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/255487/201123-article6.pdf
?sequence= &isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/S8KD-KHL7] (observing that there is a legal
professional duty of confidentiality in China which has similarities to the U.S. law of attorneyclient privilege, and suggesting that such a privilege is "admitted in civil litigation and arbitration"
but that "the issue of privilege is not paid so much attention in China"); see also Pierre Heitzmann,
Confidentiality and Privileges in Cross Border Legal Practice: The Need for a Global

Standard?, 26 ASA BULL. 205 (2008) (discussing attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrines in China and other countries).
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how it should conduct proceedings-including evidentiary considerationsbut without addressing the issue of privilege.
The decision to "punt" to arbitrator's discretion-without providing
boundaries or guidance-appears to be favored by common law countries.
The English Arbitration Act,94 for example, grants tribunals a broad power to
determine procedures of evidence in arbitration. The Act gives tribunals
power to decide "whether any and if so which documents or classes of
documents should be disclosed between and produced by the parties,"95 but
it stops there. There is no further guidance on how the tribunal shall make
such decisions on document production or what it should do when confronted
with conflicting party expectations about the confidentiality or required
disclosure of documents.
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is even more
vague. 96 There is no textual provision granting arbitrators express discretion
to conduct proceedings, 97 yet where the parties have not otherwise agreed, it
is common to grant arbitrators this implied discretion.98 For U.S. states
adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law, 99 presuming it is not preempted by the
94. Arbitration Act of England and Wales 1996, c. 23, http://www.legislation.gov
.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents [http://perma.cc/L9YK-6L6V].
95. Id. § 34(2)(d).
96. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018).
97. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 8, at 2147 ("The FAA does not contain provisions addressing
the subject of arbitral procedures or providing a basic procedural framework for arbitrations;
rather, the FAA effectively leaves all issues of procedure entirely to the parties and arbitrators.
The FAA does so by providing for the validity of agreements to arbitrate, including their
procedural terms, in §2, and by providing for orders to compel arbitration, in accordance with the
provisions of the parties' arbitration agreement, in §4; both provisions require giving effect to the
parties' agreed arbitral procedures and, in the absence of any such agreement, leaving the arbitral
procedures by default to the arbitrators' general adjudicative authority, without imposing any
statutory limitations on that authority.").
98. See, e.g., Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Marrowbone Dev. Co., 232 F.3d
383, 389 (4th Cir. 2000) ("An arbitrator typically retains broad discretion over procedural matters
.... "); Nat'l Post Office Mailhandlers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1985)
("Arbitrators are not bound by formal rules of procedure and evidence, and the standard for
judicial review of arbitration procedures is merely whether a party to arbitration has been denied
a fundamentally fair hearing."); Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S. A. v. Southwire Co.,
484 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (N.D. Ga. 1980) ("[A]rbitrators are charged with the duty of determining
what evidence is relevant and what is irrelevant, and that barring a clear showing of abuse of
discretion, the court will not vacate an award based on improper evidence or the lack of proper
evidence.").
99. UNCITRAL has identified that eight states within the U.S. have adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law, namely California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Oregon, and Texas. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with Amendments as Adopted in 2006,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial-arbitration/status
[https://perm
a.cc/52DH-7YFC] (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
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FAA, even those states offer unbounded discretion to tribunals without

articulating rules, standards, or conflict of laws principles to help resolve
questions of privilege.
Historically, the South African arbitration law, as a mixed common and
civil law system, was one of the few countries to expressly reference tribunal
authority to address matters related to legal privilege, albeit it did so in an
unusual way. As a general rule, the South African Arbitration Act... generally
provides leeway in terms of how tribunals can gather evidence including the
right to administer oaths, summon witnesses, and otherwise gather
information relevant to the dispute.' Nevertheless, while the Act fails to
address how tribunals can and should identify the law applicable to privilege
issues, it implicitly acknowledges that tribunals must assess privilege issues
but without providing any guidance as to how to perform that task. Namely,
certain provisions within Article 14 permit evidence collection "subject to
any legal objection"'0 2 and a later provision detailing "offenses" that can
occur during the arbitration proceedings identifies that a person who
"willfully insults any arbitrator ... or willfully interrupts such proceedings

or otherwise misbehaves" is guilty of an imprisonable offense but also
identifies that "the law relating to privilege" for witness conduct nevertheless
applies.0 3 In October 2017, the South Africa National Assembly passed a
new law incorporating the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Arbitration, meaning South Africa has become a jurisdiction with even less
guidance and more discretion for tribunals resolving privilege issues.104

100. The Act, which was originally codified in 1965 and amended in 1996, neither makes a
distinction between domestic and international arbitration. See Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 (S.
Afr.)
(updated
through
1996),
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/
files/legislations/arbitration act42ofl965.pdf [https://perma.cc/W83Q-P9H6] (last visited Sept.
18, 2019). But see infra note 104 (identifying that in October 2017, South Africa modified its law
to expressly adopt the Model UNCITRAL International Arbitration law).
101. Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, supra note 100, at arts. 14, 16.
102. Id. at arts. 14(1)(b)(iii), 14(1)(b)(iv).

103. Id. at art. 22(1)(f).
104. National Assembly Passes InternationalArbitration Bill,

PARLIAMENT REPUBLIC

S.

AFR. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-passes-

international-arbitration-bill [https://perma.cc/5VFV-6J9H]; see also International Arbitration
Bill of 2017 art. 19(2) (S. Afr.) http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2017InternationalArbitrationBill-150517.pdf [https://perma.cc/869M-VMFE] ("The power conferred
upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality
and weight of any evidence.").
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THE IBA RULES: GUIDANCE FROM SOFT LAW

Parties sometimes expressly incorporate the IBA Rules on the Taking of
Evidence in International Arbitration.. 5 into their arbitration agreement
before a dispute arises. Even after the fact, parties and tribunals can agree to
be bound by the IBA Rules, either through a submission agreement or a
1 6
procedural order.
The IBA Rules are highly unusual-and proactive-in offering guidance
to tribunals about privilege issues and managing party expectations. First, the
Rules start out granting tribunals a standard power to "determine the
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence."'0 7 The Rules
then address issues of privilege and confidentiality head on, granting
arbitrators the power to "exclude from evidence or production any
[d]ocument [because of] legal impediment or privilege under the legal or
ethical rules determined by the ... [t]ribunal to be applicable."' l 8
It then sets up a major innovation-which has yet to be replicated by any
institution or national law-namely, it offers factors that tribunals may
address when analyzing issues of privilege. Specifically, the IBA identifies
multiple factors for tribunal consideration, including: (a) the need to protect
confidentiality in order to receive legal advice or in connection with
settlement negotiations, (b) party expectations when the privilege was
created, (c) possible waiver of privilege, and (e) the need to maintain fairness
and party equality, "particularly if they are subject to different legal or ethical
rules."'0 9 In other words, the IBA Rules do the best job of any public
document of highlighting privilege issues and identifying factors for tribunal
assessment to aid the determination of the law applicable to privilege."0
105. IBA

2010),

RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L ARBITRATION (INT'L BAR ASS'N

https://www.ibanet.org/ENewsArchive/IBA_30June_2010_EnewsTakingof_

Evidence-new rules.aspx [https ://penna.cc/5MQC-T57B].

106. The Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration suggests that tribunals
should "have regard to" the IBA rules, but tribunals are "not bound to apply" those same rules.
ACICA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 77, at art. 31.2.
107. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L ARBITRATION, supra note 105, at art.
9.1.
108. Id. at art. 9.2(b).
109. Id. at art. 9.3.
110. The approach has, as one scholar argues, the benefit of offering a subject matter specific
approach. See Bradford, supra note 13, at 911 ("Part of the problem is that scholars are viewing

the problem too broadly. Most conflicts scholars are searching for a single, grand theory
acceptable for all cases. The result is a broad, vaguely worded standard that provides little

guidance in particular cases."). Bradford advocates a return to state territoriality to ascertain
privilege. Id. at 913 ("A territorial rule works best for the attorney-client privilege; in fact, a
territorial rule is the only approach that works, given the purpose of the privilege."); id. at 948-
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And yet, in terms of predictability and clarity, while creating a "nudge"
for arbitrator consideration, the Rules neither create a duty to use the factors
in decision-making nor enhance the predictability of how to use those factors
to resolve concerns about the applicable privilege or resolution of specific
privilege disputes. While there is a suggestion of a need to maintain fairness
between parties with different expectations, the Rules do not set the baseline
that the ICDR promotes-namely the "race to the top" in using the most
protective privilege. Rather, it sets up the possibility that the IBA Rules could
create a "race to the bottom," where only the lowest common denominator
and the smallest mutual scope of legal privilege applies, meaning that more
matters will be disclosed and possibly subject to waiver elsewhere."' There
is also little practical guidance as to how these multiple factors should apply,
particularly if factors point in different directions about what is privileged.
Finally, the IBA Rules still offer no guidance as to how tribunals should
ascertain the applicable law of privilege. This opens up a privilege vortex,
wherein it provides tribunals with indicators of legitimacy-namely
reference to soft law principles promulgated by experts-that nevertheless
permits them to bypass a conflicts analysis and skip directly to cherry-picking
IBA factors that appeal to the lures of intuitive decision-making." 2 Given the
wide discretion implicitly granted by the silence and lack of guidance in the
applicable law-in parties' agreements, institutional rules, and national
laws-such an outcome would be justified. Yet, the trade-off of delegating
broadly and without bounded discretion creates a risk that tribunals will make
unpredictable decisions that genuinely surprise parties and generate serious
downstream externalities. While the IBA Rules are a maj or step forward from
unbridled discretion and provide tribunals with some ex ante legal guidelines
to follow and offer some direction for parties managing their expectations,
the Rules nevertheless fail to address the problems of predictability of the law
applicable to issues involving privilege. These guidelines are, however, a
better alternative than a complete vacuum." 3
49 (proposing that, for predictability and certainty, the most relevant territories are the law of the
state of the attorney's practice or the client's location and arguing that the state of attorney's
practice is preferable).
111. This is, for example, the approach the European Commission adopted in its review of
legal professional privilege in the context of competition law. See supra note 20 and

accompanying text.
112. See also Reiser, supra note 10, at 673 (cautioning about a potential race to the bottom).
113. When drafted, the IBA Rules were an effort to balance competing expectations of parties
from different legal backgrounds and cultural traditions by articulating flexible, but acceptable
(i.e. tried and tested in practice), guidelines. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L
ARBITRATION, supra note 105, at 2 ("The IBA Rules of Evidence reflect procedures in use in
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As a practical matter, the scope of uncertainty created by the guidelines of
the TBA Rules and other sources of law were perhaps both understandable
and less problematic in a different era of international arbitration," 4 which
had less transparency".5 and arbitral pronouncements had a narrow sphere of
influence, binding only the parties and with little public impact.116 We are
many different legal systems, and they may be particularly useful when the parties come from
different legal cultures."); id. at pmbl., at 4 ("These IBA Rules ...are intended to provide an
efficient, economical and fair process for the taking of evidence in international arbitrations,
particularly those between Parties from different legal traditions."). In ICA, where arbitrations
were often confidential and the adjudicative record was not necessarily in the public domain, a
more practical and less formal approach that omitted detailed discussion of legal reasoning was
perhaps an efficient, cost-effective way of managing the process and containing costs related to
discovery.
114. Historically, major challenges of international arbitration tended to involve issues like
finding a proper balance between civil and common law traditions or identifying the proper
neutrality for parties from democratic market-based economies and communist non-market
economies. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the "Invisible
College" of InternationalArbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 434 (2015); see also
YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 63-69
STONE

SWEET

& FLORIAN

GRISEL,

THE

EVOLUTION

OF

INTERNATIONAL

(1996);

ALEC

ARBITRATION:

171-72 (2017); Siegfried H. Elsing & John M.
Townsend, Bridging the Common Law CivilLaw Divide in Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT'L 59 (2002);
Tom Ginsburg, The Culture ofArbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1335, 1336-38 (2003);
Serge Lazareff, International Arbitration: Towards a Common Procedural Approach, in 4
CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 31 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry
A.K. Rider eds., 1999); Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for
Reassessing Bias Under the Specter ofNeoliberalism, 41 HARv. INT'L L.J. 419, 427-30 (2000).
The modern sphere of concerns about international arbitration in an era of resurging nationalism,
populist backlash, social fragmentation, and social media are different.
115. As previously noted, transparency and confidentiality of international arbitration
(including its proceedings, documentation, procedural orders, and awards) was historically
standard. Yet, the paradigm is shifting towards a greater emphasis on transparency and making
public documentation in international arbitration-including documentation that may be
privileged. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1301 (2006); see also Robert D.
Argen, Note, Ending Blind Spot Justice: Broadening the Transparency Trend in International
Arbitration, 40 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 207 (2014); Avinash Poorooye & Rondn Feehily,
Confidentiality and Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration: Finding the Right
Balance, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 275 (2017).
116. With awards being generally confidential (not necessarily appearing in court records
when recognition and enforcement was sought), awards and other pronouncements by arbitral
tribunals had limited precedential value. International arbitration awards have limited (sometimes
no) de jure value as a source of precedent; nevertheless, particularly on novel matters of
international law (as compared to matters of domestic law, which are best settled by the
legislatures and judges of the domestic state), awards can have de facto effect as precedent and
can influence other tribunals. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral
Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND
JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY
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now in an era when tribunals' pronouncements of legal matters, which can
include privilege issues, are subject to enhanced public scrutiny. This means
that the previous status quo will benefit from a re-assessment and privilege
determinations warrant enhanced consideration of their effect both upon the
evolution of law and the legitimacy of international dispute settlement. It is
therefore helpful to have an understanding-based upon broad data, rather
than unconfirmed reports or potentially unrepresentative experiences-of
how tribunals assess the law applicable to privilege and use that feedback to
improve the legal structure for managing issues of legal privilege that are
central to the attorney-client relationship and trust in the system of law.

V.

DIVINATION OF THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND APPLICATION OF
THE APPLICABLE LAW

Thus far, this Essay has explored the doctrinal gap in the hard law (and
soft law) for guiding tribunals in the exercise of their mandate and delegated
discretion. Nevertheless, privilege conflicts are a regular and inevitable
source of tension among parties in international arbitration. This means that
tribunals must wrestle with these challenging issues and may do so in
disparate ways.
In many respects, identifying patterns of how tribunals use their delegated
discretion is an empirical question." 7 Yet, some have made sweeping
FuTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 265, 272-73 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008); Committee on
International Commercial Disputes of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Publicationof InternationalArbitrationAwards and Decisions, 25 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 34
(2014); Franck et al., supra note 2, at 1126; David M. Howard, CreatingConsistency Through a
World Investment Court, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 35 n.247 (2017); Irene M. Ten Cate, The
Costs of Consistency: Precedentin Investment Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
418, 436-45 (2013); see also Richard C. Chen, Precedent and Dialogue in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 60 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (2019) (discussing precedent and influence of arbitration
awards in ITA).
117. One survey begins the classification process, exploring forty-four potential decisions,
although sometimes without benefit of the text of the actual decision or relying upon press reports.
See, e.g., Shehata, supra note 9, at app. II at 403. Compare id. at 409 (discussing an April 6, 2010
decision but only citing the March 31, 2011 award in GEA v. Ukraine and classifying the case as
using a "most protective" law approach and analysis of international rules set out in the OSPAR
arbitration), with GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award
(Mar.
31,
2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita03 56.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3B26-FTEV] (making no reference to a decision from "April 6, 2010" or "6
April 2010" and failing to use any of the terms "privilege," "legal advice" or OSPAR arbitration
in the cited award); compare Shehata, supra note 9, at app. II at 404 (discussing a case involving
a German and Cypriot party and citing M6ckesch), with MOCKESCH, supra note 13, at 228-20
(discussing the case and noting the tribunal's procedural order is unpublished, preventing
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suggestions about the practice and tradition of international arbitration but
without providing systematic analysis-or otherwise acknowledging that a
perceived practice could be a statistical outlier and unrepresentative of a
broader pattern of behavior. Particularly in international commercial
arbitration (ICA), there is a dearth of data." 8 While there is a broader swathe
of publicly available investment treaty arbitration (ITA) awards, which can
provide information about how tribunals wrestle with privilege issues, the
privilege analysis offered in ITA awards runs the risk of being systematically
different; and ITA disputes may not be sufficiently similar to ICA to draw
strong inferences about arbitration more generally." 9 While there will be
inevitable methodological challenges, rather than doing nothing, it is
worthwhile exploring the available public case law to benchmark potential
patterns about how tribunals exercise their adjudicative mandate on matters
of legal privilege, particularly attorney-client privilege. This can, in turn,
inform debates about the relative merits of balancing tribunal discretion in an
specific case (which can lead to unpredictable results but may reflect a "fair"
result) against the use of firm ex ante rules (which can lead to more
predictable results but may not do "justice" in the individual case).
This section seeks to understand and classify the existing arbitral decisions
about how, in practice, tribunals identified, used, and applied the law of
attorney-client privilege in international arbitration. In primarily exploring
ITA and ICA disputes, it first starts with the classic point of conflicts of law
analysis, namely party agreement-whether express or implied-of the
applicable law about how tribunals should adjudicate attorney-client
privilege issues. Second, it explores how tribunals have used the IBA Rules
to divine the content of applicable law, analyzing the small number of cases
that actively use the IBA Rules and the somewhat larger set of tribunals
offering passing references to the Rules, with varying results. Next, the Essay
interpretations of the award from being confirmed independently); compare Shehata, supra note
9, at app. II at 404 (referring to a New York case based ICC arbitration and citing Heitzmann),
with Heitzmann, supra note 93, at 229-30 n.73 (providing a factual background around a
purported case involving adjudication of a privilege issue but failing to provide information to
permit verification of the facts or tribunal analysis). Shehata makes an effort at identifying the
"standard" for tribunal assessment, yet the classification schema is neither clear nor
operationalized to permit replication. Shehata may have been using concepts from Meyer-Hauser
and Sieber. See Meyer-Hauser & Sieber, supra note 89, at 183-85; Shehata, supra note 9, at app.
II at 403 n. 191. Scientific classifications should be precise, transparent, and valid to enhance their
inferential value. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Promise and Peril of Empiricism and
International Investment Law Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Andrea Bjorklund, Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kr611
eds., forthcoming 2020).
118. Franck et al., supra note 114, at 435-36.
119. Id. at 439-40.
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explores tribunals' more regular use of "international law" and its ambivalent
interaction with national legal concepts for identifying privilege law, where
tribunals have used three different techniques to divine the applicable law,
often with problematic results. Fourth, the section turns to those limited
number of cases where tribunals identified a specific national law as the law
applicable to attorney-client privilege, identifying whether and how tribunals
opted to apply that law. Finally, the section identifies the set of cases where
there was a "grab bag" of approaches, with tribunals making adhoc decisions
about the law of attorney-client privilege in international arbitration. As the
review demonstrates, there is broad variance in how tribunals address and
resolve matters. As attorney-client privilege is a perennial concern that is
likely to be central to adjudication in most international arbitrations, 2 ' the
variance in reasoning, outcome, and quality of decisions suggest that-for
something as critical to the integrity and conduct of the legal profession-it
is well worth taking a more considered, analytical, transparent, and
predictable approach.
A. The Possibility ofParty Agreement
First, as previously indicated, parties are generally free to agree on aspects
of the arbitration process, including the process of applying evidentiary
privileges or the law applicable to legal privilege claims. Finding cases where
the parties address this issue in their arbitration agreement is a major
challenge, as parties presumably either fail to make express agreements on
privilege ex ante and instead let matters be addressed by tribunals expost.
There is, however, some authority demonstrating that tribunals have
honored party agreements regarding privilege determinations, particularly in
ex ante agreements in investment treaty disputes under NAFTA. 12 ' These
120. While attorneys from different cultures may have different legal traditions about the
availability or scope of document production (whether through discovery or disclosure), in

international arbitration, disclosure and document exchanges are not unusual, meaning disputes
about the scope of disclosure are inevitable. As a practical fiscal manner, the profitability of law
firms is affected by document production and disclosure, which means firms arguably have a
financial interest in having more document review and disclosure. While some of the financial
incentives may change as third-party funding evolves, it is reasonable to anticipate that

disclosure-and disputes about what must be produced or withheld-will be a component of
international arbitration for the foreseeable future.
121. There was one NAFTA case where, with strong guidance of the tribunal in an order, the
parties apparently agreed expost to confidentiality obligations for a series of documents (some of
which were potentially privileged) and the agreement clarified that exchanges did not result in a
waiver of privilege. Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Gov't of Can., UNCITRAL (ICSID
Administered

Case),

Confidentiality

Order,

13,

22

(Feb.

18,

2008),
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cases reflect that international arbitration tribunals have been willing to apply
the privilege law to which the parties agree. This has primarily relied upon
express party agreement as to domestic law, implied party agreement on
domestic law, or express party agreement for the use of principles deriving
from international sources.

1.

Parties' Express Agreement for National Law

Glamis Gold v. United States is one of the clearer examples of a tribunal
following parties' agreement to apply the specific national law that both
parties agreed was applicable. The Glamis Gold tribunal acknowledged that
the parties had jointly stipulated that the tribunal should look to the U.S. law
of privilege to guide decisions about privilege and evidence admissibility.'2 2
The parties disagreed, however, about which state's law within the United
States governed privilege determination.' 2 3
Rather than an open-ended analysis of the potential applicable law, Glamis
Gold followed the parties' will and the tribunal focused its analysis on legal
principles emanating from law within the United States.' 24 The tribunal
explained that it "reviewed the case law of numerous United States
jurisdictions-including California and the District of Columbia, neither of
which were found to be outliers-and attempted to identify general consensus
between courts that might be helpful in defining what the parties would
reasonably expect to apply in this situation,"' 2 5 presumably to more
accurately reflect the parties' agreement as to applicable law. The tribunal
then analyzed multiple U.S. sources-including case law and treatises-that
established basic elements of attorney-client privilege and work product
26
protections.1
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8320.pdf
[https ://perma.cc/9XLK-TX73].
122. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Decision on the parties' request for production of
documents withheld on the grounds of privilege,
19 (Nov. 17, 2005),
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/usa/Glamis/Glamis-Evidence-Ruling_0 I.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6NM8-5NNL] [hereinafter Glamis Gold v. USA]. The tribunal also indicated

that the parties referred to the IBA Rules, but primarily as regards issues of materiality rather than
legal privilege. Id. 18.
123. Id. 19.
124. Id. 20.
125. Id.

126. The tribunal did not, however, cite a basic source, namely the EthicsRestatement, which
contains basic and fundamental standards for professional obligations including attorney-client
privilege and work product protection. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§§ 68-93 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). Instead, the tribunal discussed cases identified on its own
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Parties' Implied Agreement for National Law

Beyond express party consent on the applicable law, one tribunal found
implied party consent to an applicable law of privilege. Specifically, one
party's express assertion that the applicable law was the national law of
Canada and the other party's failure to contest that law (and cited Canadian
law in their responsive brief) created an implied agreement.' 2 7
In Niko, which involved a commercial arbitration at ICSID, the tribunal
placed extensive reference upon Canadian domestic law.' 28 In the
contract-based dispute, the tribunal decided to use Canadian privilege law to
assess legal privilege. 2 9 The tribunal observed that Niko Canada had
conducted an investigation in Canada in order to "provide advice to [Niko
Canada] concerning and to defend against allegations arising from alleged
corruption in civil, criminal or regulatory forums"'30 in connection with
corruption allegations by the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission and
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police involving potential improper payments
by either Nikko Canada or its subsidiary, Niko Bangladesh.' 3 ' In short order,
the tribunal stated documents related to an internal investigation "were
generated by an investigative service provider in Canada to a Canadian law
firm retained by a Canadian company related to a Canadian investigation.
The issue of privilege thus is clearly linked to Canada."' 2 Observing that
there was a Canadian law firm and Canadian client involved, the tribunal
simply stated that "legal privilege thus clearly is subject to Canadian law."' 3 3
While focusing on "clearly" intuited principles, that may not have been so
clear to other adjudicative bodies, " Niko failed to use any conflicts principles
(or even the IBA Rules) to dictate its conclusion or otherwise explain why
investigation with ties to other jurisdictions (possibly with different or less

(primarily under federal law), cases submitted by the parties, and one source quoting Moore's
FederalPractice. Glamis Gold v. USA, supra note 123, at 7 23-24, 28-32, 34-37.
127. Niko Res. (Bangl.) Ltd. v. Bangl. Petroleum Expl. & Prod. Co. Ltd., ICSID Case Nos.
ARB/10/11
and
ARB/10/18,
Procedural
Order
No.
22,
(July
27, 2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9247.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3 34-RXH7] [hereinafter Niko v. Bangladesh Petroleum].
128. Id.
129. Id. 22.
130. Id. 15.
131. Id. 1, 15.
132. Id. 22.
133. Id.
134. Recall that a Delaware court in a similar context involving Canadian privilege decided
instead to apply the Delaware law of attorney-client privilege. See Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp. v.
BCE Inc., 392 BR. 561, 595-96 (D. Del. 2008).
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protective privilege regimes) was irrelevant.' 35 Instead, the tribunal's real
analytical innovation was to imply that both parties had consented to
Canadian law, using the express assertion by one party and the failure to
reject the assertion (or provide an alternative) by the counter-party. The
tribunal's primary explanation was:
The Parties, too, in their argument on the question of privilege rely
on Canadian law. The Claimant asserts specifically that the issue is
governed by Canadian law. The assertion is not contested by the
Respondents who rely on Canadian jurisprudence. The 3Tribunal[]
6
therefore consider[s] the issue under the law of Canada. 1
In other words, parties should be cautious in how they argue issues of
attorney-client privilege, lest a tribunal deem the failure to object to an
applicable law constitute implied consent to be bound by the law proffered

by a counter-party.
3.

Parties' Express Agreement for International Legal Sources

Beyond national law, international arbitration tribunals have been willing
to consider other forms of legal obligations to identify the content of attorneyclient privilege. This is particularly interesting as there is no international

135. One commentator provides a post hoc effort to classify this approach, suggesting that
the tribunal used the "Most Closely Connected Law Approach," even though the tribunal never
identified this as their guiding legal principal. Shehata, supra note 9, at 413. If the tribunal had
used this methodology, which has similarities to U.S. conflicts approaches focusing on the "Most
Significant Relationship" or "Center of Gravity," Swiss approaches like "Characteristic
Performance," or European "Closest Connection" tests, this would have been preferable; it was
not, however, what the tribunal expressly did. Luo Jumning, Choice of Law for Contracts in
China: A Proposalfor the Objectivization ofStandardsand Their Use in Conflicts ofLaw, 6 IND.

& COMP. L. REV. 439, 448 (1996) (discussing different conflicts methodology including
most significant relationship, center of gravity, and characteristic performance); Alan Reed, The
INT'L

Rome I Regulation and Reapprochement of Anglo-American Choice of Law in Contract: A
HeraldedTriumph of Pragmatismover Theory, 23 FLA. J. INT'L L. 359, 371-74 (2011); Jeffrey
M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First,Second) and Interest

Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 329 (1997) (discussing multiple U.S. based approaches to conflicts
analysis). Cognitive psychology demonstrates the danger in post hoc justification and problems
inherent in hindsight bias. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich,
The "Hidden Judiciary":An EmpiricalExamination ofExecutive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J.

1477 (2009) (testing the influence of hindsight bias on administrative law judges); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571

(1998) (discussing hindsight bias and its implications for legal systems).
136. Niko v. Bangladesh Petroleum, supra note 128, at 23-24.
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convention on the topic of attorney-client privilege,' 37 and there is no clear
suggestion that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate attorney-client
privilege forms part of customary international law.'3 8
In this vein, some tribunals have been content to honor the parties' choice
about applicable law-but do so without reference to pre-existing national
law. Rather, with parties' consent, tribunals instead rely upon international
sources to justify their determinations of the law applicable to privilege and
its application to specific cases. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as the law
underpinning the claim and consent derives from a treaty, the tribunals taking
this categorical and international-based approach to attorney-client privilege

137. While there is a treaty on the international taking of evidence, the treaty only regulates
the procedures for collecting evidence rather than dictating and identifying the substantive law of
privilege or attorney-client confidentiality. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 744, 478 U.N.T.S.
231; David S. Jones, The Privilege Stops at the Border,Even If A Communication Keeps Going,
8 S.C. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 297, 318 (2012); see also Tulip Computs. Int'l B.V. v. Dell Comput.
Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469, 475 (D. Del. 2003) (noting different laws may apply to Hague
Convention evidence requests and stating that parties must "take the most restrictive view of
privilege applicable, whether it be under United States or Netherlands' law."); Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519 n.17 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (discussing how parties can assert
privileges in connection with the Hague Convention but noting that there could be one or more
applicable substantive laws that apply); Alan M. Anderson & Bobak Razavi, The Globalization
of Intellectual Property Rights: Trips, BITs, and the Search for Uniform Protection, 38 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 265, 287 (2010) ("WIPO recently issued findings noting that no international
intellectual property treaty regulates attorney-client privilege.").
138. There is not clear evidence that attorney-client privilege is a customary international
law right. See Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1982 E.C.R. 1577,
1608-09 (suggesting that European Community law has some standards that may incorporate
some protection of attorney-client communications, but not relying on principles of international
law); Stephen A. Calhoun, Globalization'sErosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and What
U.S. Courts Can Do to Prevent It, 87 Thx. L. REv. 235 (2008) (arguing that transnationally,
attorney-client privilege is being eroded); Kuitkowski, supra note 8, at 100-01 (noting "it is
difficult to see how any international standard [of attorney-client privilege] would be developed
and enforced" and "[c]ommentators generally do not look favourably on such suggestions,
arguing that transnational rules are very difficult to formulate"); Andrea E. K. Thomas,
Nongovernmental Organizationsand the InternationalCriminal Court: Implications ofHobbes'
Theories of Human Nature and the Development of Social Institutions for Their Evolving
Relationship, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 435, 455 (2006) (noting that "ICTY Rule 97 which grants
a privilege to attorney-client communications" but not discussing the attorney-client privilege as
a matter of international custom); see also Reiser, supra note 10, at 662 ("At this time, no
transnational standard [of attorney-client privilege] exists."); Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at
378-79 (stating "[i]t has not been determined whether certain privileges can be considered a
general principle of law that ought to be applied by international tribunals in international
arbitration" and noting, generally, how difficult it is to ascertain the scope and content of "general
principles" in international law). Compare infra note 178 (noting that, although one commentator
suggests there is now an international law of attorney-client privilege in international arbitration,
the merits of that claim are far from certain).
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derive from disputes arising from investment treaties, rather than national law
or commercial contracts.
In Bilcon v. Canada,both parties agreed that the tribunal should apply a
four-part test about the existence of lawyer-client privilege, as identified by
a previous arbitral tribunal. 3 9 The earlier tribunal, Vito Gallo v. Canada,
created a test for privilege purportedly on the basis of "international law"14 although Vito Gallo's exercise in identifying the content of the elements of
privilege primarily focused on Canadian precedent, a procedural order in a
1930s case against the Bank for International Settlements, a law review
article, and IBA Rule Article 9.2.' Even though the Vito Gallo test was not
a binding rule, Bilcon used the parties' agreement on the test for assessing
privilege issues; and it then used its considerable discretion under the
UNCITRAL rules to apply the parties' agreement.' 42
The Bilcon tribunal is not alone in its willingness to adopt party agreement
as to the applicable law. Lone Pine took a similar approach, with the tribunal
honoring party agreement. Rather than engage in its own assessment of the
applicable law-whether derived from international law, national law, or soft
law-the tribunal applied the Vito Gallo test, as both parties agreed it was the
proper standard for assessing legal privilege in their case.'4 3 For parties that
wish to agree on the content of privilege law using the test from Vito Gallo
and its progeny,' creating party agreement that those principles provide the
binding standards for attorney-client privilege seems a sensible way to reduce
139. Clayton v. Gov't of Can. (Bilcon), PCA Case No. 2009-04, Procedural Order No. 12,
721 (May 12, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 1163.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2B7-XQF4] [hereinafter Bilconv. Canada].
140. Vito Gallo v. Gov't of Can., PCA Case No. 55798, Procedural Order No. 3, 47 (Apr.
8, 2009), http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/gallo/procissues/gallo-23.pdf
[https:
//perma.cc/VSZS-W3ZX] [hereinafter Vito Gallo v. Canada].
141. Id. at 77 41-42, 47, 49-50; see also infra notes 142, 211 (discussing the use of Vito
Gallo v. Canada).
142. Bilcon v. Canada, supra note 139, at 29 ("Accordingly, the Tribunal decides that
solicitor-client privilege attaches to communications containing legal advice from any
government lawyer if and to the extent that the lawyer acts as legal counsel in the manner intended
under the Gallo standard.").
143. Lone Pine Res. Inc. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Procedural Order
on Withheld and Redacted Documentation,
5 (Feb. 24, 2017), http://icsid
files.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C4406/DC 10040 En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ZY9-K58Y]. Similarly, although it involved parliamentary rather than
attorney-client privilege, Windstream applied Canadian law to privilege issues, where both parties
agreed Canadian Law applied. Windstream Energy LLC v. Gov't of Can., PCA Case No. 201322,
Procedural
Order
No.
4,
77
3.2-3.3
(Feb.
23,
2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4277.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W2PC-32XB0]. The tribunal ultimately disagreed with Canada's interpretation
about the scope of Canadian privilege law. Id. 7 3.4-3.5.
144. See infra Section V.C.1.
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risk of conflict (and minimize costs by identifying a clear set of principles)
that tribunals have been willing to honor.
B. "Pirates of the Caribbean"14 5 and the IBA Rules."More Like Guidelines
Most of the publicly available decisions adjudicating issues of attorneyclient privilege in international arbitration have not been fortunate enough to
secure party agreement about the applicable legal standards to guide tribunal
assessments. Instead, tribunals are left in a vacuum, making privilege
assessments using a variety of bases and methods, which generates large
variance in the application of legal principles and arbitral discretion.
One of the only common denominators' in tribunal conduct is their
reliance on the soft law guidance offered in the IBA Rules to assess privilege
claims. While reference to the IBA Rules is by no means universal and
tribunals also act without relying upon the ex ante guidance, there have been
multiple cases where tribunals cited the IBA's soft law principles, but often
with different levels of focus and analysis.
1.

Detailed Analysis of IBA Rules to Guide Identification of
Applicable Law

At one end of the scale are those tribunals that, for whatever reason, have
determined that it was appropriate both to analyze the law applicable to
attorney-client privileges and to use the IBA Rules to assist them in that task.
Apotex v. United States.4 6 is arguably one of the most detailed analyses,
exploring privilege issues in a 19-page order. In that case, the tribunal made
extensive and detailed reliance on the IBA Rules, making those guidelines
(rather than a conflict of laws analysis) the primary basis for privilege
assessment. The focus in that case was not upon the factors more generally,
but on two core conceptions in the IBA rules, namely party expectations and
maintaining fairness and equality among parties. Apotex rejected the use of
national law for supplying the substantive standard for decisions of

145. In the classic Disney film, Pirates of the Caribbean,the "Pirate Code" is explained to
be "more what you call 'guidelines,' than actual rules." Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of
the Black Pearl, WIKIQuOT,
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Pirates of the Caribbean:_
The Curse of the BlackPearl_[https://perma.cc/3VYD-5MPF]_(emphasis omitted) (last visited
Sept. 17, 2019).
146. Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Procedural
Order on Document Production Regarding the Parties' Respective Claims to Privilege and
Privilege Logs, (July 5, 2013), https://2009-20 17.state.gov/documents/organization/2 14055.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S236-KA640] [hereinafter Apotex v. USA].
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privilege.'47 Instead, the tribunal focused on its authority and discretion
granted by the IBA Rules.' 48 Noting both parties used aspects of U.S. law to
make arguments about the availability of privilege to a U.S.-based consultant
working with U.S.-based external legal counsel for a Canadian client, the
tribunal relied upon IBA Rule 9.3(c) and (e), with a particular focus on party
expectation of privilege. 4 9 Although not expressly applying U.S. national
law, the tribunal functionally applied U.S. privilege principles, 5 ' which many
U.S. states follow,' 5 ' through its analytical decision to focus on "the critical
question" of "whether the principal purpose of the third-party
communications was to provide for legal advice" from the attorneys to the
clients.'52 Observing the primary focus of the communication with a
third-party was in pursuit of legal advice for a client seeking regulatory
advice on dealing with a U.S. government agency, the Apotex tribunal
determined that the communications were privileged and not subject to
waiver. 153

Two other tribunals expressly used the IBA Rules in a unique way and
shared unusual commonalities, namely both tribunals were adjudicating ITA
disputes, used the IBA Rules to apply a standard the most protective privilege
standard available, were chaired by the same Columbian arbitrator,'54 and
ultimately identified that the applicable privilege derived from national law.
Namely, Pogtovd banka v. Greece, exhibited a strong reliance on the IBA
Rules (and its commentary) to dictate the determination of the applicable
law."' Although not as detailed in its reasoning as Apotex, Pogtovd banka
used Article 9(3) to identify the applicable law of privilege, with a strong
focus on party expectation and the need to ensure fairness and equality
between the parties.' 56 The tribunal made the effort to cite a specific portion
of the Commentary on the IBA Rules, namely "that in such cases [involving
questions about the scope of variations in attorney-client privilege] 'applying
147. Id. 14.
148. Id.
149. Id. 1114, 20-21, 45.
150. Id. 33, 38, 40-42.
151. Many states follow the same type of common law elements regarding the creation of
attorney-client privilege, as reflected by the Ethics Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 126, at §§ 68-93.
152. Apotex v. USA, supra note 146, at 32.
153. Id. 1 32-37.
154. See infra notes 155, 160.
155. Pogtovi banka, a.s. v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Procedural Order
No. 6, 11 2, 11-12, 14, 16 (July 20, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw4051.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C7P-EBAB] [hereinafter Pogtovdi banka v.
Greece]. The president was Eduardo Zuleta. Id. at 1.
156. Id. 11 -12.

51:0935]

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

different rules to the parties could create unfairness by shielding the
documents of one party from production but not those of the other." 1

57

In one

of the only two surveyed cases that applied the "most protective privilege"
standard, 158 the tribunal opted to apply the national law that provided the
broadest privilege and denied Greece's document requests. 159 While it would
have been helpful to understand how the tribunal applied that privilege,
Pogtovd banka was one of the more specific, analytical, and transparent
analyses of applicable privilege.
The second case, Blanco v. Mexico, focused its analysis on the IBA Rules,
namely Articles 9(2)(b), 9(3), and associated commentary. 6 ' Although a
traditional conflicts analysis was absent, the tribunal thoughtfully explored
the factors that were vetted by the international community and relevant to
the substance of privilege. In an effort to avoid disclosure of information, the
two U.S. citizen claimants objected to document production on grounds of
both U.S. attorney-client privilege (and work-product) and Mexican
confidentiality law.' 6 ' The tribunal ultimately applied "the highest standards
on protection" to both parties, namely the law of the United States.' 62 When
doing so, the tribunal focused on its concerns about party expectations 63 and
the need to promote balance and, within a single arbitration, treat parties with
fairness and equality of treatment. 164 Intriguingly, in applying the "US law"
of attorney-client privilege, the tribunal failed to recognize that, within the
157. Id. 14 (citing Commentary on the revised text of the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of
Evidence in International Arbitration, p. 25).
158. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
159. Pogtovi banka v. Greece, supra note 155, at 11 16-17.
160. Blanco v. United Mexican States, ICISD Case No. UNCT/17/1, Procedural Order No.
5, (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9557.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9K7-3E8J] [hereinafter Blanco v. Mexico]. The chair of the tribunal was Dr.
Eduardo Zuleta. Id. at 1.
161. Id. 11 5, 14-16.
162. Id. 19.
163. The tribunal noted the two U.S. nationals-Josh Nelson from Iowa and Jorge Blanco
from Florida-were likely to have U.S.-based expectations about the nature of their relationship
with their counsel, explaining that as "nationals of the United States of America . ..their
expectations on privilege could have been formed by the approach to privilege prevailing in their
home country. If that was the case, their expectations should not be frustrated." Id. 18; see also
id. 19 (referring to claimants' expectation at the time the legal advice was provided).
164. The tribunal explained it was "concerned that applying different standards on the matters
of privilege could affect the balance and equality of treatment of the Parties. Such difference in
treatment could result, on the one hand, in Claimants not having to produce communications
between them and their US legal counsel while Respondent, in a subsequent rounds of Claimants'
document production requests, being obliged to produce communications with Mexican legal
counsel; but on the other, could result in Claimants having to produce documents not subject to
confidentiality in Mexico, but which production may result in violation of applicable US law.
This would create a clear imbalance in the treatment of the Parties in these proceedings." Id. 17.
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United States, attorney-client privilege is generally a matter of state law
(rather than the law of a country as a whole) and contains variations in content
and application. Rather than conducting its own analysis-or consulting the
Restatement on the Law Governing Lawyers,165 which compiles the general
law in the U.S. on attorney-client privilege and confidentiality-the tribunal
1 66
relied on submissions about the content of law from the claimants.

2.

Passing References to the IBA Rules to Guide Identification of
Applicable Law

Other tribunals have likewise used the IBA Rules to guide their
adjudicative power, but engaged in lighter substantive analysis. 67 It is
possible that tribunals may be attempting to engage in cost effective decisionmaking for potentially non-dispositive issues. 68 Nevertheless, the loose
analytical approach for such fundamental questions begs the question of
whether tribunals use IBA guidelines as "legal cover" for intuitive decisionmaking, random outcomes, or the creation of a lex mercatoria of attorneyclient privilege.
Some cases are particularly light in their use of the IBA Rules to address
attorney-client privilege, including those cases that drop a footnote to refer to
the Rules or make a passing reference to the Rules' existence. 69 In these
cases, it is not necessarily clear how the IBA Rules have contributed to

165.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,

supra note 126, at §§ 68-

93.
166. Blanco v. Mexico, supra note 160, at 20 n.4.
167. Other parts of this Essay also identify tribunals that make brief references to the IBA
Rules but without material analysis of or reliance upon them. See, e.g., infra notes 215-16, 222.
168. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Bilcon v. Canada, supra note 139, at 11 18-20 (stating the IBA Rules were
guidelines but acknowledging that Article 9.2(b) provides broad discretion and the applicable law
in NAFTA and UNCITRAL Rules are otherwise silent on privilege); Vito Gallo v. Canada, supra
note 140, at 11 38, 41 (noting the IBA Rules are applicable to the dispute and those Rules "leave
it to the Arbitral Tribunal to determine the legal rules applicable to privilege"); Gramercy Funds
Mgmt. LLC v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. UNCT/18/2, Procedural Order No. 3, 6 (July
12,
2018),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9834.pdf
[https://perma.cc/329S-LCQV] [hereinafter Gramercy v. Peru] (referring to IBA Rule Article 9.2
in a footnote); Lion Mexico Consol. LP v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/15/2,
Procedural
Order
No.
6,
5
(Sept.
3,
2018),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9920_O.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QAH5-W2T5] [hereinafter Lion Mexico v. Mexico]; Pawlowski AG & Projekt
Sever s.r.o. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/1 1, Procedural Order No. 2, 6 (Aug. 14,
2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9896.pdf [https://perma
.cc/MRM5-HHLF] [hereinafter Pawlowski v. Czech Republic].
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identifying the applicable law of attorney-client privilege. 70 Other cases,
although still somewhat unclear as to how the IBA Rules have functioned,
provide some detail about how those guidelines might apply in specific cases.
In Philip Morris v. Australia, the tribunal relied both upon its discretion
under the UNCITRAL and IBA Rules as "a guideline" to justify its approach
to privilege analysis-which involved rejecting reliance on existing ITA
awards, ignoring standards from national law, and instead making its own
determinations given "its own specific factual and legal circumstances" of
the case and little else. 17 1 Stating that it had the discretion to determine the
applicable law and assess what it "determines to be compelling," the tribunal
simply commented favorably on each party's efforts at producing documents
and then made privilege determinations on a document-by-document basis
72
without further explanation. 1
Tidewater v. Venezuela likewise used the TBA Rules to provide the
guidelines for assessment of document production and exclusion. 173 The
tribunal failed, however, to make a substantial decision as regards the
applicable law of privilege or the application of any standards-whether from
the IBA, national law, or conflicts of law-but the tribunal instead
acknowledged that legal privilege may attach to communications soliciting
legal advice and required the claimants "to prepare a schedule of all the
174
documents ... and the basis for the privilege claimed in respect of each."'
Eli Lilly v. Canada, however, simply explained that the TBA Rules of
Evidence were applicable, initially in its Procedural Order No. 1175 and later
reiterated the use of procedures for making objections to disclosure on the
170. Although not an attorney-client privilege case, Biwater cited the IBA Rules to bolster
its assessment of privilege regarding state secrets. Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic
of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 2, 9 (May 24, 2006),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaOO88.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR5V9R8T] [hereinafter Biwater v. Tanzania].
171. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Procedural
Order No. 12 Regarding the Parties' Privilege Claims,
4.4-4.10 (Nov. 14, 2014),
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1483
[https://perma.cc/44AJ-E 7 U5] [hereinafter
Philip Morris v. Australia]. The decision speaks generally of privilege, but not specifically about
attorney-client privilege, solicitor-client privilege, or legal professional privilege.

172. The decisions on a document-by-document basis were made in a separate document
(Annexes 1 and 2), which were not made publicly available. Id.
173. Tidewater Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No ARB/10/5, Procedural
Order No.
1 on Production of Documents,
33
(Mar. 29, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0861.pdf
[https ://perma.cc/FF28UFCY].
174. Id. 1 34-35.
175. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., Case No. UNCT/14/2, Procedural Order No. 1, 7.2,
12.7 (May 26, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3212.pdf
[https ://perma.cc/3A6P-2N6X].
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basis of privilege.' 76 Unfortunately, the annexed Redfern schedules
(identifying the specific areas of disclosure disagreement) were not made
public and the bases for the tribunal's ultimate privilege assessment is
unknown.' 77

One might wish that these tribunals were, perhaps, not so economical with
their explanations as to how to identify the applicable law of privilege, the
content of that law, and its application. What is available, however, offers a
relatively important window into understanding how tribunals have been
willing to use (or not use) the soft law guidance that is available to them in
guiding their decisions.

C. InternationalLegal Authority andIts Ambivalent Relationship with
NationalLaw
In an effort to ascertain the law of privilege, some tribunals have opted to
develop an ad hoc "international law" law of privilege. Yet they do so using
different methodologies. The variations reflect both tribunals' uneasy
interaction with how the national law of privilege intersects with international
arbitration and tribunals' failure to use conflicts methodologies to identify the
applicable law. Particularly for ITA disputes, 78 public decisions contradict
the suggestions of commentators that use of national law is the "standard"

176. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., Case No. UNCT/14/2, Procedural Order No. 2,
34,
14(d)
(Apr.
6,
2015),
https ://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7198.pdf [https ://perma.cc/6YV4-APTL].
177. See id. 14(a) (indicating the Redfern schedules were part of the decision but failing to
include them in the public document). As the tribunal spoke of privilege generally, it is possible
that attorney-client privilege was not involved.
178. One commentator argues that "attorney-client privilege in all likelihood exists as a
general procedural rule of public international law" and notes "there is significant authority
supporting the view that attorney-client privilege has been accepted as a rule of procedure
applicable to international arbitration"; but those observations fail to recognize that the majority
of cases cited involve ITA (rather than commercial) cases, and this Essay discusses most of those
decisions in greater detail. NATHAN D. O'MALLEY, RULES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE 291, 294 (2019). The creation of an international law rule
requires evidence. In the case of attorney-client privilege, there is no applicable treaty or
convention on point; there is insufficient evidence of custom given the relatively small and recent
number of cases; and identification of a sufficient "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations" is problematic. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)
(1945). At best, the decisions (and academic commentary, such as the book written by the
practitioner and this article by a professor) are "judicial decisions and the teachings"; but it is an
open question as to whether those are from "the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations" and, in any event, they are a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."
Id. at art. 38(1)(d).
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approach to resolving privilege issues in international arbitration. 179 The
PhilipMorris tribunal made this point bluntly, stating that "while the home
rules of either Party might provide useful analogies, they cannot provide the
basis for the tribunal's decision or can be otherwise determinative in the
180
case."'
In doing so, these tribunals exhibited a somewhat ambivalent relationship
with national law, primarily doing so in three different ways. A first set of
cases essentially has created a free-floating, delocalized, self-declared
content of attorney-client privilege. With three of the five decisions available
from 2018 adopting the delocalized test from Vito Gallo, one might suggest
that approach is the emerging norm, l ' although others might observe that
179. See

ICCA-QUEEN
120-35
(2018), https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/10/40280243154551/icca-reports_4_tpf-final_
forjprint 5_april.pdf [https://penna.cc/H3AB-BXRC] [hereinafter QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE]
(discussing national law and noting "[m]ost commentators are of the view that the weight of
authority and the better view is that domestic privileges should apply, rather than international
standards" and "commentators have suggested that consensus exists regarding the factors to take
account of in determining applicable national law that relies considerably on national law"); see
INT'L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, REPORT OF THE

MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 118,

also INT'L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, DRAFT REPORT FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF

THE ICCA-QUEEN

MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, 93, 95-101 (2017), http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/10/14053115930449/
submission-version forjpublic comment finalversion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DMH-DH6R]
("As a practical matter, arbitrators often look to national rules and standards to determine the
existence of a privilege, either as a category or as applied to particular documents. Many
commentators are of the view that the weight of authority and the better view is that domestic
privileges should apply, rather than international standards."); Berger, supra note 10, at 514-15
(discussing the "pragmatic consensus" to focus on national law); supra note 25 (discussing Gary
Born's assessment of the use of the national law of privilege).
180. Philip Morris v. Australia, supra note 171, at 4.6; see also Biwater v. Tanzania, supra
note 170, at 7-9 (refusing to use Tanzanian law, including its Constitution and Evidence Act, to
create public interest immunity preventing disclosure); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Gov't
of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Decision of the Tribunal Relating to Canada's Claim of
Cabinet Privilege,
7 (Oct. 8, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw8434.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CXM-X7Y]
[hereinafter UPS v. Canada]
(determining the scope of Crown privilege, i.e. state secrets would not be resolvedunder Canadian
or other national law but under the "law governing the Tribunal"). But see infra note 210
(discussing UPS v. Canada and noting the tribunal focused on case law from several common
law jurisdictions to ascertain the scope of privilege). Although Philip Morris did not involve
express assessment on attorney-client privilege, the tribunal used the IBA Rules to assess whether
documents were privileged. Philip Morris v. Australia, supra note 171, at
4.4, 4.6; see supra
notes 172-73.
181. Identification of reliable trends, however, is a quantitative statistical question that this
Essay does not analyze. It is possible, as many awards analyzed in this Essay derive from ITA
decisions that became public, that a case selection effect may overweight the impact of ITA
privilege determinations that have become public or underweight decisions that are either nonpublic ITA decisions or ICA disputes. See infra note 182 (noting that Vito Gallo and the three
2018 decisions all involved the same presiding arbitrator).
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Vito Gallo and the three 2018 decisions share the same chair.'8 2 Irrespective
of the hesitation to use national law directly, tribunals sometimes might use
national law to serve as another "guide" about how to independently divine
the law applicable to privilege. This second group of decisions use what is
essentially a comparative approach, by focusing upon commonalities of
attorney-client privilege across different national cultures. A third minority
methodology has involved a determination that the "international law" of
attorney-client privilege requires reliance upon national law.

1.

Vito Gallo and Progeny: Free Floating "International Law"

While many tribunals have expressed a straightforward declared
preference for international law when ascertaining the applicable law of
privilege, sadly those tribunals have not offered a clear indication of the
source or content of that "international law" of privilege. Many of these cases,
initially, were in the context of NAFTA.
Vito Gallo v. Canadais a classic case on privilege, serving as a core basis
for reasoning in later tribunals, including Bilcon 83 and three others in 2018.'4
In Vito Gallo, the tribunal referred to legal authorities from Australia,
Canada, England, and the United States; but it then quickly dispensed with
these national authorities and failed to rely upon them. Instead, in a move
akin to the infamous Swit v. Tyson 85 decision that opened the floodgates for
creating a general federal common law that existed independently of state law
and a Congressionally or constitutionally authorized mandate, the tribunal
declared that there were four criteria for evaluating attorney-client privilege

182. Juan Fernmindez-Armesto, a Spanish national, was the presiding arbitrator in Vito Gallo.
Vito Gallo v. Canada, supra note 140, at 1. He was also the presiding arbitrator in the three 2018
decisions. See infra notes 196, 202. This perhaps suggests that the decision may not be a function
of international law but instead derives from having a particular presiding arbitrator. See supra
notes 154, 155, 160 and accompanying text (noting that the only two tribunals applying the "most
protective privilege" standard were also chaired by the same presiding arbitrator).
183. Bilcon v. Canada, supra note 139, at
21, 25-26. In Bilcon, the tribunal held that
international law governed the resolution of the dispute, even though NAFTA is silent on privilege
and the contours of any privilege-related right. Id.
17, 19. Rather, given parties' agreement that
Vito Gallo should apply to the case, Bilcon used the reasoning from other NAFTA arbitration
awards-which technically are not dejure precedent-to evaluate privilege. Id. 21, 25-26; see

also supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (noting the tribunal applied a legal standard
reflecting party agreement).
184. See infra notes 198-205 (discussing three decisions referring to Vito Gallo to underpin

the articulated standard of privilege).
185. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).

51:0935]

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA TION

issues in international arbitration.' 86 There is no indication from where these
elements derive.8 7 The tribunal's failure to explore conflict of laws or more
clearly derive the legal authority for the identified criteria is noteworthy, as a
tribunal member was a professor who wrote the leading Canadian work on
conflicts. "

In St. Marys v. Canada, the tribunal outsourced the adjudication of
privilege issues to a neutral third party. 8 9 The neutral (Justice James
Spigelman) then used NAFTA caselaw-which had involved determination
of the applicable law through party agreement, particularly Bilcon'9 ° and
Glamis Gold 9'-and used those decisions to create factors to identify waiver
of attorney-client privilege.' 92 While the St. Marys decision was laudable in
its effort to rigorously analyze the factors that it self-identified,' 93 ultimately,
the outcome was decided by one criteria, namely the "overriding interests of
justice."' 94 This emphasis on justice is similar in flavor to Judge Leflar's

186. The four criteria articulated by the tribunal for establishing privilege were: (1) the
communication must be drafted by a lawyer acting in his or her capacity as lawyer; (2) an
attorney-client relationship must exist between the lawyer and the client; (3) the communication
must be for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice; and (4) both the lawyer and the client,
in the giving and receiving of advice, must have acted in expectation that the advice would be
kept confidential in a contentious situation. Vito Gallo v. Canada, supra note 140, at 47.
187. In identifying its four criteria-which are sensible from a common law perspectivethe tribunal provided no authority for why "[i]n general, a document needs to meet [the four
criteria] in order to be granted special protection under solicitor-client privilege." Id. One
commentator attempted to resuscitate Gallo's reasoning by claiming post hoc that these criteria
line up under the Bank for InternationalSettlements consolidated cases that will be discussed
infra notes 210-11. O'MALLEY, supra note 178, at 294. But that author acknowledges that Vito
Gallo added an extra element; and if it had been following the Bankfor InternationalSettlements,
the tribunal could have easily cited it, particularly as the chair from Vito Gallo often includes
footnote citations to cases to justify attorney-client privilege decisions. See infra notes 203-04. If
Bank for InternationalSettlements was the ratio driving the tribunal's decision, as a matter of
legitimacy, integrity, and rule of law, it would have been beneficial to include that justification
and reference.
188. J. G. CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. 2002).
189. St. Marys VCNA L.L.C. v. Gov't of Can., Report on Inadvertent Disclosure of
Privileged
Documents
(Dec.
27,
2012),
http://www.naftaclaims.com/
disputes/canada/stmarys/stmary-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3EK-4R3E] [hereinafter St. Marys v.
Canada].
190. See supra notes 139-42, 184 (discussing Bilcon and noting that party agreement to
international principles articulated by Vito Gallo formed the basis of the decision).
191. See supra notes 122-26; infra note 211 (discussing Glamis Gold and noting how party
agreement to national principles formed the basis of the tribunal's determination and looking for
common standards of privilege within the United States).
192. St. Marys v. Canada, supra note 189, at 13-14.
193. Id.at 14-16.
194. Id.at 16.
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conflicts methodology for identifying applicable law, which requires analysis
of the better law that does "[j]ustice in the individual case."' 95
In 2018, the Gramercy tribunal,' 96 with a sharp nod to Vito Gallo, likewise
articulated its own freestanding standard of attorney-client privilege, which
was devoid of a connection to national law or conflicts analysis.' 97 Rather
than explaining how the tribunal identified the applicable standard, the
tribunal announced a case-related privilege (to prevent disclosure), provided
that four criteria' 9 8 were established, namely: the document was created by or
for a lawyer in connection with legal capacity, the relationship was based
upon trust (i.e., which the tribunal stated covered in-house and external
lawyers), the communication involved the purpose of giving or obtaining
legal advice, and both counsel and clients acted "with the expectation that the
advice would be kept confidential in a contentious situation."' 99 There was
also a separate privilege for documents prepared by a party or counsel in
anticipation of either litigation or arbitration. 0 0 Given the nature of the
decision, which set out the procedure for addressing privilege, there were no
specific assessments of how the privilege might apply in the particular case.2 0 '
Other tribunals-namely Lion Mexico and Pawlowski that were chaired
by the same arbitrator who presided over Gramercy and Vito Ga[[oZ°-took
195. Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations,supra note 23, at 296; see also supra notes

21, 23 (discussing Leflar's approach to "better law"); infra notes 267-69 (discussing Leflar);
Joseph William Singer, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Curtain: The Place of Better
Law in a Third Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (2000) (arguing that "substantive

justice should be a crucial factor in conflicts law, alongside considerations of multistate justice"
which is assisted by the consideration of "better law"). Admittedly, neither the tribunal nor Judge
Spigelman ever referred to Judge Leflar or a conflicts methodology for resolving the privilege
issue.
196. Prof. Juan Fernindez-Armesto was the presiding arbitrator in Gramercy. Gramercy v.
Peru, supra note 169, at 1.
197. Id. 23-25. There was also a brief, but disconnected, reference to IBA Rules Art. 9.2.
See id. at 6 n.5.

198. Shehata rightly notes that this test appears to be "heavily influenced by the standard of
attorney-client privilege in common-law jurisdictions." Shehata, supra note 9, at 413.
Interestingly, the arbitrators on the tribunal were composed of a Spanish (chair), a co-arbitrator
from France, and a Canadian co-arbitrator who was trained in both civil and common law, which
makes the preference for a more common law approach intriguing. See Gramercy v. Peru, supra
note 169, at 1 (identifying the three arbitrators).
199. Gramercy v. Peru, supra note 169, at 24.
200. Id. 25. The procedural order also set out a standard for privilege involving settlement
discussions. Id. 26.
201. Intriguingly, the tribunal took a unique approach and indicated that it would consider
cost allocation in connection with document production, including the use and objection to
privilege. Id. 49-50.
202. The common presiding arbitrator (or president) of all three 2018 panels-and the Vito
Gallo tribunal-was Juan Ferndindez-Armesto. See supra notes 183, 197; see also Lion Mexico
v. Mexico, supra note 169, at 1; Pawlowski v. Czech Republic, supra note 169, at 1.
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a similar approach to privilege, using nearly identical language and a citation
to Vito Galo.2" 3 The one material difference was that both Lion Mexico and
Pawlowski failed to provide a separate work-product-like protection for
documents prepared in anticipation of adjudication.20 4
Vito Gallo and its progeny, by contrast, was more precise than ACP Axos
Capital.20 5 Without reference to any national or international standard (or
another source, including academic commentary), the tribunal announced
what was functionally the law of the case, namely that "legal advice provided
by external legal counsel is covered by privilege and does not need to be
justified" 206 and later clarified that "sending correspondence in copy to
counsel does not suffice to create legal privilege. The document in question
must contain legal advice or seek legal advice in order for privilege to attach
to it." ' 20 7 While these insights map well with the established privilege law of
common law nations, 208 the authority for or justification of these assessments
203. There were minor textual variations among the three decisions in the scope and
standards of attorney-client privilege, all pointing to Gramercy being slightly broader in scope.
Gramercy and Lion Mexico both referred to documents "pertaining to the provision of legal
advice" whereas Pawlowski only referred to documents "containing" legal advice. Lion Mexico
v. Mexico, supra note 169, at 20; Pawlowski v. Czech Republic, supra note 169, at 22;
Gramercy v. Peru, supra note 169, at 23. Gramercy had the broadest standard, referring to
materials "drafted by a lawyer acting in his or her capacity as a lawyer, or addressed to a lawyer,
seeking, discussing or concerning his or her legal advice." Gramercy v. Peru, supra note 169, at
24. In contrast, Lion Mexico omitted the terms "discussing or concerning" and focused solely
on "seeking." Lion Mexico v. Mexico, supra note 169, at 21. Pawlowski excluded that material
and only used the phrase "drafted by a lawyer acting in his or her capacity as lawyer." Pawlowski
v. Czech Republic, supra note 169, at 23.
204. For Lion Mexico, the totality of the tribunal's analysis focused on attorney-client and
settlement privileges. Lion Mexico v. Mexico, supra note 169, at
20-23. For Pawlowski, the
entirety of the privilege law focused on attorney-client and settlement privileges. Pawlowski v.
Czech Republic, supra note 169, at
22-25. There were separate provisions in both orders to
address concerns regarding: either technical or commercial confidentiality and/or political or
institutional sensitivity. Lion Mexico v. Mexico, supra note 169,
26-27; Pawlowski v. Czech
Republic, supra note 169, at
29-34.
205. ACP Axos Capital GmbH v. Republic of Kos., ICSID Case No. ARB/15/22, Procedural
Order
No.
2
(Mar.
6,
2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw8520.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9RC-76GB].
206. Id. at 2.
207. ACP Axos Capital GmbH v. Republic of Kos., ICSID Case No. ARB/15/22, Procedural
Order No. 3,
11 (July 5, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw9221 _0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VK5-M6FR]; see also id. 18, 26-27.
208. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (discussing various laws establishing the
elements of privilege or confidentiality); see also Protiva v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
IUSCT Case No. 316, Chamber Two, Award No. 566-316-2,
35 (July 14, 1995),
https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/pdf/en-edgar-protiva-and-eric-protiva-v-thegovernment-of-the-islanic -republic -of-iran-award-award-no -566 -3 16-2-friday- 14th-july- 1995
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was lacking. While a practical solution for the case, one can only guess at the
scope and applicability of the privilege.

2.

Divining International Law Through Commonalities Across
National Law

Vito Gallo and its progeny were not alone in a free-wheeling approach to
identifying the law applicable to attorney-client privilege. Rather than
creating a general international law disconnected from existing legal
principals, other tribunals were more focused upon exploring and integrating
direct conceptions from different national laws.
The cases in this category covered many different types of international
arbitrations. First, in a set of consolidated disputes against the Bank of
International Settlements at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a procedural
order from a U.S. law professor failed to conduct an express conflict of laws
analysis. Instead, the order focused on how attorney-client privilege is
"widely applied in domestic legal systems" and also "recognized in public
international and international commercial arbitration rules and arbitral
awards."2 9 Focusing on "the core of the attorney-client privilege in both
domestic and international law," the tribunal generally looked at principles
of privilege that were common to various types of national laws on privilege
with a focus on common law, and only cited one U.S. federal court decision
as authority."'
There were also multiple ITA cases that took a comparative law approach
to identify the law applicable to attorney-client privilege. Glamis Gold, an
early ITA award addressing privilege, designed its own standard for defining
U.S. privilege law, but which the parties had agreed was applicable. That
tribunal's methodology then required ascertaining common principles of

[https://perma.cc/2M4Q-C5HU] (stating that "under no rule of law known to the tribunal" is there
a law protecting non-confidential information "because the attorney-client privilege protects only
information an attorney has gained from his client in confidence").

209. Reineccius v. Bank for Int'l Settlements, PCA Case No. 2000-04, Procedural Order No.
6,
180
(June
11,
2002),
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/volXXIII/169-182.pdf
[https ://perma.cc/HT84-8XYM].
210. Id.; see also id. at 180-82 (applying the privilege standard to the disputed disclosure
requests); UPS v. Canada, supra note 180, at
7-13 (determining that the scope of Crown
privilege by looking at case law from the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada to
identify the scope of privilege before concluding there was insufficient public interest to justify

the existence of a privilege).
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different states' approaches to privilege and applying those commonalitiesbut without directly applying the actual law of any single state.21 '
Caratube v. Kazakhstan is another intriguing ITA case where the tribunal
demonstrated an ambivalent relationship with national law. In an unpublished
decision (but discussed in the media), commentators reported that the
Caratube tribunal simultaneously rejected the use of a specific national law
to address privilege questions, but instead looked at multiple national laws
(and other sources) as guidance.2 12 Caratube purportedly rejected the
Republic of Kazakhstan's request to apply the French law of attorney-client
privilege to documents hacked from the government's computer network that
were later published online. Even though ICSID hearings were held in Paris
and the government's counsel was admitted to Paris bar, the Caratube
tribunal held the Paris connections were irrelevant.2" 3 Instead, despite finding
the parties' nationalities (namely U.S. claimants suing the state of
Kazakhstan) of greater interest, the tribunal nevertheless focused on generally
accepted principles of lawyer-client privilege. Specifically, the tribunal said
that it would be guided by the IBA rules and, more importantly, principles
common to French, U.S. and Kazakhstan laws which have a "close
connection" to the case.2" 4 Ultimately, using this transnational standard that
served as a functional hodge-podge of privilege law, the tribunal admitted the
non-privileged hacked documents, but held attorney-client privilege existed
2 15
for other documents involving attorney-client communications.

211. Glamis Gold v. USA, supra note 122, at
19-20; see also Apotex v. USA, supra note
146, at
32-33 (failing to apply any specific national law, but instead exploring the law of
multiple common law jurisdictions to decide the scope and application of the attorney-client
privilege).
212. Alison Ross, TribunalRules on Admissibility of Hacked Kazakh Emails, GLOBAL ARB.
REv. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034787/tribunal-rules-onadmissibility-of-hacked-kazakh-emails
[https ://perma.cc/JQ96-4VSC];
Brigitta
John,
Admissibility ofImproperly ObtainedData as Evidence in InternationalArbitrationProceedings,
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG
(Sept.
28,
2016),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
2016/09/28/admissibility -of-improperly -obtained-data-as-evidence-in-international-arbitrationproceedings/ [https ://perma.cc/MVM9-NHAB].
213. Ross, supra note 212.
214. Id.
215. In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal focused on neither party having argued about
the applicable law of privilege waiver, instead exercising its discretion to find attorney-client
privilege was retained because of the material's confidential nature and the entry into the public
domain against the state's will. According to the news article, the tribunal focused on the
"universal 'sanctity' of the lawyer-client legal privilege - held by the House of Lords to be
stronger than the privilege attached to other confidential communications ... [and] the European
Court of Justice in the Akzo Nobel case, which called the protection of written communications
between witness and client 'an essential corollary to the effective exercise of the rights of the

defence."' Id.
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There have also been ICA disputes where, in attempting to resolve
privilege questions, tribunals initially referenced national law but ultimately
abandoned the exercise in favor of creating a privilege concepts that focused
upon commonalities shared across legal cultures.
In a case reportedly before the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, a
tribunal focused on national law-but only the national law of civil law
jurisdictions.21 6 The case involved a distributorship dispute between two
continental European parties. At issue were two letters written by the
respondent's legal representative (a common-law-trained attorney) that the
counsel had sent to its client. When the claimant attempted to submit those
two letters into evidence-despite the lack of clarity about how the claimant
had managed to secure access to the respondent's attorney-client
correspondence-the tribunal refused to use any reference to common law
principles of privilege. As reported, the tribunal's opinion instead suggested
common law was irrelevant as there was "no connection to common law in
this case other than that counsel of [the respondent] has been trained in a
common law system."2'17 Instead, in what appears to be a controversial
choice,21 8 the tribunal admitted the documents and decided not to apply the
law of any specific country but relied on "general principles developed by
21 9
civil law and in civil law arbitrations.1
In a second ICA dispute, ICC Case No. 13176, the tribunal similarly
decided that the privilege "should be constructed according to the criteria
prevailing in the civil law countries," but the tribunal used a different process.
Rather than focusing on shared legal principles common to all parties, the
tribunal instead focused upon factors such as the parties' nationality and the
Paris seat of arbitration.220 Ultimately, what all these cases share in common

216. Meyer-Hauser & Sieber, supra note 89, at 169-71. Shehata, supra note 9, at 404, refers

to this as a "Vienna Arbitration" and cites the Heitzmann article, supra note 93, as authority; a
review of the Heitzmann article on page 236 n.81, however, refers back to the Meyer-Hauser and
Sieber article. See also MOCKESCH, supra note 13, at 222-23 (reporting on the case as it was
reported by Heitzmann).

217.
218.
tribunal
219.
220.

Meyer-Hauser & Sieber, supra note 89, at 170.
See MOCKESCH, supra note 13, at 223 (' [T]his is not a clear-cut case in which the arbitral
should have relied only on general principles.").
Meyer-Hauser & Sieber, supra note 89, at 170; Heitzmann, supra note 93, at 236.
Procedural Order in Case No. 13176 (ICC May 2006), reportedin 25 INTERNATIONAL

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: PROCEDURAL DECISIONS IN ICC ARBITRATION

10-11 (2014), 16. Ultimately in that case, and without reference to a specific national law, the
tribunal determined that the privilege had been waived because of subsequent disclosure of the
document (containing portions of legal advice) to the European Commission and the
Commission's subsequent failure to object to disclosure on the basis of legal professional
privilege, meant that any privilege for the embedded advice from civil law lawyers from two
different countries (i.e. respondent's state and Swiss lawyers) had been waived. Id. 17-24.
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is the tribunals' willingness to look to common principles shared across
national regimes deemed to be relevant to the decision and a utilization of
those common standards to make attorney-client privilege determinations.
3.

International Law as National Law

One tribunal took a rather unusual approach to identifying the applicable
law of privilege. Rather than setting out the principles to guide their
identification of the applicable law, Cambodia Power made a declaration
which, in several respects, created a confusing interplay between national and
international law. Specifically, the Cambodia Power tribunal stated, "that
International Law governs the question of the admissibility of [a witness
statement and in] applying International Law, the Tribunal finds that
questions of impediment, privilege, agency, confidentiality and fiduciary
duties ... are governed by Californian law."2 2' How the tribunal made that
assessment that international law dictates the application of a national law
remains somewhat mysterious. This minority position may largely be a
function of the peculiarities of that case, as the tribunal repeatedly referred to
exigencies affecting its deliberations on privilege,"' suggesting the approach
need not be followed by future tribunals.

D. The Sporadic Use of Pure NationalLaw to Determine PrivilegeIssues
There have been a limited number of tribunals, both in ICA and ITA
disputes, that expressly identified national law applied to resolve attorneyclient privilege disputes. These cases were sporadic in the methodology used
for ascertaining which national law applied and the content of the identified
law.
Several cases that decided a national law of privilege applied were
discussed earlier. Specifically, Niko permitted Canadian law to be applied to
attorney-client privilege issues from an internal investigation in Canada due
to implied party choice. 3 Meanwhile, two other tribunals did so, not via a

221. Cambodia Power Co. v. Kingdom of Cambodia, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/18, Amended
Decision on the Claimant's Application to Exclude Mr. Lobit's Witness Statement and Derivative
Evidence,
2
(Feb.
14,
2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw6348.pdf [https ://perma.cc/7YHC-X4CH].
222. The tribunal indicated the decision was done "as a matter of urgency" and articulated
concerns about "further delay." Id. The tribunal did, however, refer in passing to the IBA Rules
of Evidence, as agreed by the parties, but without providing any explanation for how those rules

influenced their assessment. Id.
223. See supra notes 127-36.
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conflict of laws analysis, but through using the IBA rules.224 In Pogtovd
banka, Greece requested documents that reflected communications from the
Slovak claimant's in-house counsel.22 5 The tribunal focused on two potential
applicable national laws, namely Slovak law or Greek law. In one of the more
well-reasoned decisions that is publicly available, the tribunal noted that
Greek law offered broader protection than Slovakian law for attorney-client
privilege and in-house counsel226 and primarily focused on the potential
unfairness and imbalance from applying different legal standards within the
same dispute.22 7 Similarly, in Blanco v. Mexico, the tribunal applied the "US"
law of attorney-client privilege after using the IBA Rules to address concerns
about party equality of treatment, unfairness, and the need to protect the
expectations of U.S. based parties who likely expected U.S. law to apply to
attorney-client privilege.2 28
Pope & Talbott, one of the earliest NAFTA cases, also resolved an issue
of attorney-client privilege by reference to national law. While the tribunal
ultimately used Canadian domestic law exclusively and held the privilege
applied, it failed to provide a conflict of laws analysis or otherwise explain
its assessment.22 9 This may partially explain why other tribunals have rejected
the use of national law in the context of crown privilege and state secrets.230
Although they did not address issues of attorney-client privilege, one ITA
tribunal did determine that national law applied to a disclosure dispute.2 3'
224. Pogtovdi banka v. Greece, supra note 155, at 4, 1;see also supra notes 155-59
(discussing the tribunal's use of the IBA Rules).
225. Id. at 2-3, 5,7.
226. Id. at6,
13, 15.
227. Id. at 6, 16.
228. Blanco v. Mexico, supra note 160, at
18-20, 22.
229. Pope & Talbot Inc. v Gov't of Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules), Decision on
Crown Privilege and Solicitor-Client Privilege,
1.9-1.10 (Sept. 6, 2000),
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/pope/pope- Il.pdf [https ://penna.cc/PK2W-P7BU].
230. See UPS v. Canada, supra note 180 (determining the law of Canada was not applicable
to decide issues of crown privilege);_Biwater v. Tanzania, supra note 170, at 8-9 (preventing the
use of Tanzanian law to determine whether the state could withhold government documents from
disclosure in arbitration). Although not in the context of attorney-client privilege, Biwater was
particularly detailed about the international law implications. Id.at 8 (' [I]f a State were permitted
to deploy its own national law in this way, it would, in effect, be avoiding its obligation to produce
documents in so far as called upon to do so by this Tribunal... [and] stifle the evaluation of its
own conduct and responsibility ... this would be to undermine the well-established rule that no
State may have recourse to its own internal law as a means of avoiding its international
responsibilities." (citations omitted)).
231. Gionvanna A. Becarra et al. v. Argentine Republic, Procedural Order No. 3,
Confidentiality Order,
41, 124-25 (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WKQ-Y636]. After Argentina requested
access to the Italian claimants' database that was maintained in Italy, the tribunal decided that the
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Abaclat did so, however, in a way that lacked a solid explanation of why the
Italian law applied. Given the importance the tribunal appeared to place upon
Italian data protection law, however, a conflicts of law analysis would have
been useful, as arguably the Italian domestic law (following principles
required by the EU Data Protection Directive) could have been deemed a
mandatory rule from which the tribunal could not deviate.232
Lest the light reference to national law be considered a byproduct of ITA
disputes, it is important to remember both that Niko was a contract dispute
and other ICA cases touched on national law briefly. While commentary and
academic literature might suggest that a national law approach is standard,233
extensive research on public materials unfortunately failed to reveal regular
reference to national law or conflicts analysis. Specifically, there was only
one identifiable case where the tribunal referred to national law and did so in
a way that approximated a conflict of laws approach.
In ICC Case 13054, the tribunal had to decide whether two documents
must be withdrawn from the arbitration because they were protected by
attorney-client privilege.234 In resolving the issue, the tribunal first attempted
to use conflict of laws principles to identify the applicable law by searching
for the country with the "closest connection" to the arbitration.235 This was a
quite rare (but laudatory) effort, as it provided clear rule-of-law based
reasoning to the parties about the basis of the tribunal's legal assessment on
a critical issue. In a move somewhat similar to the comparative law approach,
the tribunal analyzed three different jurisdictions that might legitimately
claim to have the "closest connection," namely England (the place where the
document in dispute was created or the domicile of the lawyer), Switzerland
disclosure question required assessment under national law as "the Claimants have the Italian
nationality and that the online Database is established under Italian law, [and therefore] this issue
is to be examined under Italian law." Id. 123; see also id. 72 ('[T]ransparency considerations
may not prevail over the protection of information which is privileged and/or otherwise protected
from disclosure under a Party's domestic law." (citing Christina Knahr & August Reinisch,
TransparencyVersus Confidentialityin InternationalInvestmentArbitration The Biwater Gauff
Compromise, 6 LAW & PRAC.OF INT'L CTS. AND TRIBUNALS 97, 102 (2007))). In its interpretation
of the EU Directive and Italian law, however, the tribunal nevertheless interpreted the law as
permitting the transfer of data in this instance to Argentina. Id. 1 129-32.
232. See, e.g., Nathalie Voser, Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law
Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 319 (1996)
(explaining the application of mandatory rules). But see Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Does
InternationalArbitration Need a MandatoryRules Method?, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 103 (2007)
(expressing some skepticism about the application of mandatory rules in international arbitration).
233. See, e.g., QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE, supra note 179, at 95; supra note 25 (discussing
commentary by Gary Born).
234. Procedural Order in Case No. 13054 (ICC 2006), reported in 25 INT'L CHAMBER OF
COM., SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: PROCEDURAL DECISIONS IN ICC ARBITRATION 14 (2014).

235. Id. 6.
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(the place of arbitration), and Lebanon (the law governing the substance of
the commercial dispute).236 The tribunal determined that, irrespective of
which national law it selected, all three countries would impose a privilege.
Since all three countries would hold that a client seeking advice from an
external lawyer would expect their communications to be privileged, the
tribunal reasoned that, irrespective of which nation had the closest
connection, all three national laws prevented disclosure of the privileged
documents.237
E. The "Grab Bag": Bypassing Attorney-Client PrivilegeAnalysis
While the preceding sections have focused upon more traditional
conflicts-related ways to assess and identify the legal standards applicable to
privilege, a final set of cases are more challenging to classify. At the more
attractive end of the scale are cases where the tribunal used its traditional
procedural powers to set up systems for determining whether to exclude or
admit evidence when attorney-client issues have been raised-but without an
explanation of how assessments are made. At the less attractive end are those
cases which lacked an explanation. These tribunals share a common trait,
namely they bypass questions about the substantive law applicable to
privilege.
One common approach these tribunals used to address privilege issues
was: a reliance upon their procedural authority and discretion to focus on
mechanisms for process management to resolve attorney-client privilege
questions. These tribunals created procedures in consultation with the parties
or upon their own initiative.
Chagos Marine ProtectedArea addressed how tribunals can use party
agreement on procedural mechanics to create an opportunity to make
assessments on attorney-client privilege. Specifically, the UNCLOS tribunal
at the PCA used the parties' agreed procedures for assessing privilege (and
the acceptability of redactions) for issues of legal professional privilege and
national security.238 In that case, the United Kingdom submitted a pleading
with various redactions, which caused Mauritius to raise concerns about
improperly redacted materials; this led the tribunal to invite the U.K. to
remove all redactions "'not strictly required on grounds of irrelevancy or

236. Id. 6.
237. Id. 10.
238. In re Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA Case No. 2011-03
(UNCLOS), Award (Mar. 18, 2015), https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/Il/ [https://perma.cc/ML3H-

4PD6].
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legal professional privilege' and to indicate the basis for each redaction."23 9
After submitting a revised pleading that maintained "a number of redactions
'principally on the grounds of legal professional privilege, relationships with
third countries and national security,".' 2 40 Mauritius suggested, and the U.K.
agreed, to having a document master review an unredacted document master
to confirm non-disclosure was justified.2 4' The tribunal then proposed, and
the parties agreed to, having the presiding arbitrator make a preliminary
review of unredacted documents at the British consulate on an ex parte
basis.24 2 The presiding arbitrator subsequently found each redaction was
justified, but failed to offer either legal authority or rationale for the
determination."' The tribunal's assessment ultimately provides little
guidance about applicable legal standards that guided the decision.
While Chagos involved procedures created through party agreement,
Libananco v. Turkey resolved attorney-client privilege issues without
referring to substantive law via tribunal-created procedures.24 4 In Libananco,
Turkish criminal prosecutors had intercepted around 1,000-2,000 emails
with claimants' external counsel in an ICSID case, and those emails involved
attorney-client communications (including emails containing attachments
that included claimants' draft memorials marked "privileged") that involved
counsel's arbitration strategy and advice for the arbitration.24 5 Although
primarily focusing upon claimants' freedom to advance their case without
interference by the Turkish government,24 6 the tribunal acknowledged the
importance of legal privilege and confidentiality.24 7 It never identified the law
applicable to privilege, however.2 48 Instead, the tribunal opted for procedural
239. Id. 38.

240. Id. 40.
241. Id. 42-43.

242. Id. 47-48. The agreement also provided that unredacted versions may be reviewed
"by the Tribunal as a whole, 'unless considered unnecessary in light of the Presiding Arbitrator's
preliminary review."' Id. 46.
243. The totality of the publicly available analysis was: "the Tribunal wrote to the Parties,
confirming the President's finding that each redaction was justified and conveying the Tribunal's
decision that the redacted passages should not be subject to disclosure" Id. 49. The April 22,
2014, letter referenced in the award is not publicly available.
244. Libananco Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8,
Decision on Preliminary Issues (June 23, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0465.pdf [https://perma.cc/PXV8-SPE5] [hereinafter Libananco v. Turkey].
245. Id. 19, 43, 72.
246. Id. 72-74, 77-81.

247. Id. 78-80 (discussing the basic principles impacting the tribunal and noting the
"Tribunal attributes great importance to privilege and confidentiality").
248. The record does not reflect that claimants identified a specific law was applied to
privilege. Rather they made general references to "privileged and confidential emails sent to and
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mechanisms to address the problem, ordering Turkey to destroy all
intercepted emails relating to the arbitration and requiring Turkey to ensure
criminal investigators with access to the emails did not provide copies to or
communicate the information from the intercepted emails with anyone
defending Turkey in the arbitration. The tribunal also ordered that privileged
material (or any information deriving from the privileged material) that was
intercepted by the Turkish government would be excluded from evidence.24 9
Similarly, in Ballentine v. DominicanRepublic, privilege issues only arose
during the hearing.2 50 The final question posed during the cross-examination
of a claimant revealed that the claimants were receiving third-party
funding.25 ' When the Dominican Republic sought information about the
funding, claimants responded the information was covered by attorney-client
privilege.2 52 Without an assessment of the applicable law or its application to
third-party funding, the tribunal required claimants provide a copy of the
funding agreement to the tribunal.25 3 Upon receipt, tribunal members
indicated they had no conflict of interest with the funder, and only required
claimants disclose both the name of the funder and the date of the funding
agreement.25 4 In other words, a privilege conflict led to the tribunal making a
procedural decision with substantive implications but without detailed
explanation.
A final set of cases involves tribunals making attorney-client privilege
assessments but without clarity on the legal justification. This "grab bag"
approach is perhaps best exemplified by Loewen.255 In that case, the tribunal
held that attorney-client communications among the claimants were
received from Claimant's counsel" and nearly "all of the emails accessed by Respondent were
legally privileged." Id. 44; see also id. 72. This may be reasonable as, under the laws discussed

in this Essay, the emails and attachments sent between attorneys and clients to prepare for and
prosecute the arbitration would likely have been privileged and/or prevented from disclosure,
whether under concepts of attorney-client privilege, work product protection, litigation privilege,

and/or attorney-client confidentiality obligations from various common law and civil law
traditions. See, e.g., supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches to
attorney-client confidences).

249. Libananco v. Turkey, supra note 244, at 82.
250. Ballentine v. Dominican Republic, CAFTA-DR (UNCITRAL Rules), PCA Case No.
2016-17, Procedural Order No. 16 (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-

documents/italaw9984.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7QX-STM3].
251. Id. 3.
252. Id. 4-5.
253. Id. 6-7.
254. Id. 8-9.
255. Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on
Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction (Jan. 5, 2001),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0469.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NBC7YQ4] [hereinafter Loewen v. USA].
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discoverable on the issue of duress.2 56 There was, however, no indication in
the public record explaining that assessment.2 5 Other arbitration tribunals
have made assessments of attorney-client privilege2 58 or other privilege
claims, 2 59 but the tribunal's justification for those determinations is unclear.
256. Id. 27 (discussing tribunal privilege assessment that granted disclosure requested by
the United States in connection with the claimant's attorney-client communications).
257. One might theorize, to the extent that the claimants put duress at issue in pleading their
primary case, perhaps this was part of the basis of the assessment. Without access to the tribunal's
December 9, 1999, decision, it is impossible to say for certain. On July 12, 2019, that document
was not available on ita.law.com, naftaclaims.com, ICSID, the United Nations policy hub, or even
the U.S. Department of State website. See Loewen Group, Inc. andRaymondL. Loewen v. United
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/9813, ICSID CASE DETAILS (2019),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB(AF)/98/3
[https://perma.cc/E9PH-7CS3]; INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, Investment Dispute Settlement
Navigator,
Known
Treaty-Based
ISDS
Cases
(July
2019),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/24/loewen-v-usa
[https://perma.cc/5QS2-6C6B]; Loewen Group, Inc. andRaymondL. Loewen v. United States of
America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, ITALAw (2015), https://www.italaw.com/cases/632
[https://perma.cc/X8HC-475E];
NAFTA CLAIMS.COM, Disputes with USA
(2013),
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes-with-usa.html
[https://perma.cc/3USB-MCJQ]
(select
"Loewen" hyperlink); The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of
America,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/1/c3755.htm [https://perma.cc/46UP-QBXA]. The
tribunal's failure to explain the assessment in the record and the challenge of locating the
information may derive from the case being an early NAFTA dispute decided before transparency
norms in ITA became more commonplace, perhaps suggesting that the tribunal did not anticipate
a need to be more clear in its analytical reasoning. The Loewen tribunal had three arbitrators, one
was a famous D.C. circuit judge and former University of Chicago professor (Abner Mikva), one
was the former Chief Judge of the Australian Supreme Court (Sir Anthony Mason), and one had
been Canada's ambassador to the United Nations (Yves Fortier), suggesting that these three
individuals had the capacity to provide legal reasoning. Loewen v. USA, supra note 255, at 23.
258. In CME v. Czech Republic, the tribunal's award discussed its assessment of privilegewhich forbade disclosure of claimants' "in-house or external legal advisors to the extent that such
legal advice is related to legal proceedings or disputes"-in a procedural from June 3, 2002; but
the underlying 2002 order is not publicly available for consideration. CME Czech Republic B.V.
v. Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech), UNCITRAL, Final Award,
64 (March 14, 2003),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO180.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67JDLBLM]. One commentator suggested that attorney-client privilege was likewise assessed in
Methanex. Shehata, supra note 9, at 407. Review of Methanex, however, reveals that the word
"privilege" was only used once and that the tribunal's assessment of the admissibility of evidence
was, instead, a function of whether the documents were illegally (perhaps even criminally)
obtained. Methanex Corp. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID (UNCITRAL Rules), Final
Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part II, Chapter 1, at 3, 23-29 (Aug. 3, 2005),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N3MAGC6].
259. See Canfor Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Procedural Order No. 5, 9, 19 (May
28, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8687.pdf
[https:
//perma.cc/NL5Q-6QS2] (determining internal NAFTA negotiation history created by the U.S.
was privileged as the "Tribunal accepts the Respondent's position and considers that the internal
materials of an individual NAFTA Party established solely for that Party and not communicated
to the other Parties").
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Ultimately, this final category of cases is perhaps the most extreme in the
"wild west" landscape of privilege decisions in international arbitration.
VI.

THE WAY FORWARD: TOWARDS A CONFLICT OF LAWS APPROACH

The preceding sections have demonstrated serious legal gaps and
methodological uncertainty in the law applicable to privilege. With
institutional rules largely silent, often granting tribunals unfettered discretion
without guiding principles, and failing to manage parties' expectations,
privilege has been left to the "wild west" of adjudication. Likewise, national
laws have failed to provide determinative guidance. Meanwhile party
agreement is not standard practice. With the massive gap in clear and binding
legal rules, it would hardly be surprising that, in practice, tribunals' own
approaches to attorney-client privilege might run the gamut. The publicly
available evidence about tribunals' exercise of discretion revealed, in reality,
that there was a lack of a uniform approach and the decisions exhibited broad
variance as to both how the applicable law was ascertained and what the
applicable law ultimately was.
One might observe that each dispute (and privilege question) is unique,
and in an ad hoc arbitration system with heterogeneous issues, the variation
may be warranted. While an important and reasonable assessment, that
observation overlooks a fundamental point, however. Namely, in the current
historical moment, international arbitration must have a degree of care in how
it provides basic adjudicative services. International arbitration is supposed
to provide a clear framework for dispute settlement with procedural guidance
on issues of fundamental importance. Privilege-as it can affect the nature of
attorney-client relationships, public trust in lawyers and the arbitration
process, and possibly the outcome-is material; and it requires further
elucidation so that parties can have faith and trust in the dispute resolution
process. With international arbitration's willingness to promote rule of law
norms and enhance legitimacy in the spotlight, a more exacting focus is
warranted for an issue that goes to the heart of public confidence in the
transnational legal system.
As regards how tribunals ascertained the applicable law, the process
remains, in many respects, mysterious and shrouded in a degree of confusion
and inconsistency. Perhaps, by elucidating the process by which applicable
law is ascertained, international arbitration can begin to improve its
predictability and, at a minimum, offer enhanced clarity to stakeholders.
Providing the underlying conflicts methodology-rather than cherry picking
a result with minimal (or no) justification or permitting arbitrators to create
(rather than apply) international law-could serve the purpose of both
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identifying what is the applicable law and offering reasoning that explains
variations from other tribunals. Put another way, a conflicts-based approach
kills two birds with one stone.
The existing public decisions demonstrated that several tribunals applied
general principles of law-with a focus on international law-when
attempting to identify the scope of attorney-client privilege and its application
to international arbitration. While this approach may have an initially
intuitive appeal-as a transnational solution to a transnational problem-it
nevertheless means that tribunals are solving legal privilege claims (that
emanate from legal relationships created by national law) without reference
to national law. This sidestep has serious downsides. First, it means that
concepts grounded in national law-where there are broad variations-do not
necessarily obtain the respect which stakeholders (particularly states) might
reasonably expect and may raise concerns related to international comity. In
addition, if arbitrators are unbound from actual law when making privilege
decisions and relying on nebulous and self-defined international law
standards, they risk being seen as shaping international law without the
consent of states and otherwise upsetting parties' expectations.
Yet, the cases showed that some tribunals were intuitively engaging in a
comparative law analysis, where they divined privilege by identifying
commonalities of privilege principles from potentially interested states. This
approach is somewhat less problematic. Where privilege considerations from
those jurisdictions implicated by the contested item (i.e. a communication or
document) are very similar, focusing on comparative commonalities can
provide legitimacy to tribunals and simultaneously honor party expectations.
Nevertheless, a comparative law approach is likely only effective when all
relevant legal systems have similar privilege rules. The more likely
alternative is, with wide variation in rules and the lack of a treaty on attorneyclient privilege, some tribunals will engage in a "race to the top"2 60 and apply
the most protective privilege rules, while others might engage in a "race to
the bottom."26 ' Functionally, this means, that issues of international privilege
exhibit some of the worst characteristics of the "wild west" of international
dispute settlement.
Irrespective of whether tribunals are de facto creating their own
international law standards for privilege or intuitively conducting a
comparative law analysis, core problems remain. Aside from the potential
260. See supra notes 155-164 and accompanying text (discussing Pogtovci banka and
Blanco).
261. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing AM&S and Akzo); see also
Kuitkowski, supra note 8, at 95-99 (discussing the problems of a "most favoured" (i.e., a race to

the top) or the "least favoured" (i.e., a race to the bottom) approach).
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democracy deficit in such an approach, the wide variation risks upsetting
parties' settled expectations, creating uncertainty in the scope of privilege,
and otherwise creating an unpredictable dispute resolution process. Partiesbe they states or private parties-need certainty about applicable privilege
standards while organizing their communications, obtaining legal advice, and
preparing for dispute settlement. If legal privilege is to serve its purpose of
facilitating open and honest communication and creating high quality legal
advice to serve the public, counsel and their clients must be able to predict
which privilege rules arbitral tribunals are likely to apply, lest an uncertain
privilege become practically the same as no privilege at all. While some
might argue that establishing more specific guidance will undermine
arbitration's flexibility (which is one of its main advantages), the importance
of privilege predictability and legitimacy provides strong justification for
enhanced precision.
The best course of conduct would be for parties to take matters into their
own hands and expressly identify the privilege law(s) that may be applicable.
To impose the "law of agreement" onto the "wild west" serves parties,
counsel, and arbitrators. Irrespective of whether the agreement is expressly
contained in a commercial contract or in an international treaty offering the
right to arbitration, an express choice promotes expectation management and
offers clarity. Alternatively, parties should use those arbitration institutionssuch as the ICDR-that provide clarity, incorporating those institutional rules
expressly to provide a rule for identifying the applicable law of privilege.
In the absence of party agreement, states should consider either modifying
their national law or treaties to offer guidelines for the resolution of
transnational privilege issues. While the position of South Africa's domestic
lexfori rule could create absurd results in the international context,262 there
are reasonable alternatives. For example, one might imagine that countries
might require (rather than permit) tribunals to use the guidelines promulgated
in the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence for determining the appropriate
law of privilege.
There is, however, inevitably some tension between hard rules and doing
justice in the individual case.2 63 Perhaps because of the wide variation in
privilege law, international arbitration has eschewed making firm ex ante
rules that might create odd or unjust results in the individual case. Yet the
value of flexibility and ad hoc approaches is inevitably a question of degree.

262. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
263. Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
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Perhaps this is why others have also identified the time is ripe for a "privilege
rethink."26 4
International arbitration is on the cusp of having a "Leflar moment"
regarding attorney-client privilege where there is an opportunity for profound
change. There is value in learning from the lessons of Judge Robert Leflar
to
26 5
create an alternative approach to resolving privilege-related conflicts.
During the United States' "choice of law" revolution in the 1950s and
1960s, Professor Robert Leflar-who had been a sitting judge-wrote a
groundbreaking article about how judges actually identify the applicable law.
Historically, Judge Leflar explained, conflict of laws analysis amounted to a
judicial "hide the ball" rule, whereby a legally exacting formalist model of
identifying the applicable law became a tool of manipulation. By contrast,
Judge Leflar posited that there were real factors affecting judicial
decision-making, but those were being obscured by doctrinal concepts that
judges manipulated to identify the applicable law. As he persuasively argued,
over-reliance on mechanical rules served as "cover-ups for the real reasons
that underlay the decisions. 2 66 To permit effective advocacy and reflect the
actual rationale behind judicial decisions, Judge Leflar advocated for
transparency in conflicts analysis to identify the applicable law, and
permitting those genuine factors to form the basis of actual advocacy,
argument, and decision-making. He therefore articulated the genuine factors
that, in his view, reliably affected adjudicative decision-making and the
ascertainment of applicable law. These five "choice influencing
considerations" formed the real divination rod for identifying applicable law.
Those factors were: predictability, interstate and international order, the
264. See Douglas Thomson, White & Case PartnerCallsfor Privilege Rethink, GLOBAL ARB.
REv. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1140753/white-case-partnercalls-for-privilege-rethink [https://perma.cc/3 9M7-U8WA] (discussing keynote by Philip Capper
where "Capper went on to call for consideration of rules on an additional area, telling his audience,
'We haven't fixed privilege."'); Levin, supra note 14 ("I tend to very much agree with the eminent
Phillip Capper that privilege is an area that needs more guidance in an international arbitration
context.") (citation omitted); see also Reiser, supra note 10, at 653-54, 666, 675-78 (identifying
the challenge of predictably identifying the applicable law of privilege when no uniform rules

exist, noting a growing consensus of a need to address the problem, and arguing for the use of a
default rule to fill the gap).
265. Other commentators have identified types of conflicts methods that tribunals might use.
Michelle Sindler & Tina Wiistemann, Privilege Across Borders in Arbitration:
Multi-JurisdictionalNightmare or Storm in a Teacup?, 23 ASA BULL. 610, 613 (2005)
(indicating a variety of different choice of law rules, many of which focus upon the law of the
place-including the seat of arbitration or residency of the attorney or client-as well as general
principles); Kuitkowski, supra note 8, at 72; id. at 91-92 (suggesting other conflicts analyses
might involve the "closest connection" or "center of gravity" test). The commentators have,
however, paid insufficient attention to the insights from Judge Leflar.
266. Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,supra note 23, at 1581.
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simplification of the judicial task, the forum's governmental interest, and the
better law.267
International arbitration has a corollary problem to that identified by Judge
Leflar. Rather than a problematic overly formalized approach, international
arbitration is underly formal, lacking pre-articulated and clear legal rules to
guide discretion. Nevertheless, the result of the void creates a similar
mischief to the one that Leflar identified, namely the choice-of-law divination
dilemma creates an opportunity for adjudicative manipulation and
mismatched party expectations. This suggests that tribunals struggling with
how best to identify the law applicable to privilege may find Leflar' s conflicts
analysis insightful. If tribunals are concerned about factors of predictability
and party expectations in the creation of potential privilege, these factors can
(and should) be melded into identifying the applicable law of legal privilege.
Likewise, consideration of state interests-namely the interstate and
international order that are fundamental to a successful and legitimate
international arbitration system-could play a role in the identification of
privilege law. From Leflar's perspective, simplification and streamlining
analysis is also a potent consideration.268 Meanwhile, to the extent that one
decision has already used a Leflar-like approach to consider issues of
justice,2 69 other tribunals might usefully identify what law is preferable due
to the transnational implications and party expectations at stake.
It is correct that the application of Leflar's factors may vary in the
individual case-as these factors may weigh up differently depending upon
the considerations of each heterogeneous dispute.270 Yet providing clear,
267. Id. at 1586-88; see also supra notes 21-23, 195 (discussing Leflar and "better law").
Jepson and Milkovitch are classic examples of Leflar analysis in practice. Jepson v. General Cas.
Co. of Wisconsin, 513 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 1994); Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn.
1973).
268. It is possible that tribunals may avoid issues of applicable law to save costs. To the
extent that it takes time to have parties' brief, deliberate, and write an analysis in an order (or
award) on conflicts of law detailing privilege determinations, there will inevitably be fiscal
implications for counsel and tribunals (particularly arbitrators at ICSID or the LCIA, who work
on an hourly rate). See generally FRANCK, supra note 83 (discussing time and costs). In any event,
part of Leflar's insight from his "choice influencing considerations" was the identification that
the simplification of the task is also a real criterion influencing the decision-making of
adjudicators. See supra note 267.
269. See supra notes 189-95 (discussing St. Marys and its theoretical link to Leflar analysis).

270. While there is an inevitable risk of some unpredictability, predictability is a question of
degree, as no prediction is perfect given risks of embedded error. See Susan D. Franck & Lindsey
E. Wylie, PredictingOutcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 520 (2015)
(identifying factors that can affect error in predictions). Legitimacy, however, is fostered by
promoting adjudication that fosters determinacy and coherence, which can in turn beget
predictability. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment TreatyArbitration:
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direct ex ante standards to provide guidance on the process for helping parties
to identify the applicable law injects a degree of predictability into dispute
resolution. It also aids counsel to advocate on an effective and honest manner;
and it permits tribunals to be transparent, candid, and clear about those factors
that are the most fundamental to their adjudicative decisions, rather than
glossing over the matter or engaging in intuitive adjudication. Providing such
a structured framework, governed by Leflar's tried and tested principles, has
the benefit of being tailored to actual factors affecting decision-making,
rather than using approaches that may mask the outcome-determinative
factors. Leflar's approach has the value of intellectual honesty that offers
some constraints on adjudicative discretion while offering pre-existing
factors to enhance clarity. While no solution will be perfect-particularly in
the absence of a treaty or harmonization of national standards applicable to
attorney-client interactions-providing some guidance around conflict of
laws is an opportunity to re-insert legal norms into rules affecting a primary
legal relationship, namely interactions between attorneys and their clients.
Ultimately, providing a set of standards that tribunals must use to guide
their decisions should minimize unbridled discretion and offer a legallybased nudge (to parties, their counsel, and to arbitrators) about how to
identify the law of attorney-client privilege. It also provides an opportunity
ex ante for parties involved in transnational commercial activity to have some
notice of the process by which adjudicators may evaluate their legal rights ex
post. While infusing a conflict of laws approach inevitably injects a degree
of flexibility to deal with unique considerations of specific disputes, it does
so in a way that is grounded in clear standards with a historical pedigree.
Particularly in an era of backlash against globalization and concerns as to
international arbitration's unfettered discretion-for something as critical as
the law applicable to privilege and client confidentiality-providing more
clarity about the standards influencing privilege assessments is a fundamental
step towards promoting rule of law values and ensuring that international
arbitration serves its core purpose: providing a legitimate, enforceable, and
sustainable dispute resolution process.

VII.

CONCLUSION

There is not a regular, predictable methodology for resolving
attorney-client privilege questions in international arbitration. When

PrivatizingPublic InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FoRD. L. REv. 1521,
1584-86 (2005) (discussing indicators of legitimacy, including determinacy, coherence, and
predictability).
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tribunals are handed actual disputes, the legal vacuum has similarities to those
navigating the unsettled territory of the "wild west." Yet, over time, even a
lawless territory can gain a semblance of order and predictability, while
retaining the flavor that comes from historical experience and culture. Given
the prevalence of privilege disputes in international arbitration and the
fundamental value of having trust in an attorney-client relationship, it is vital
to find ways to move beyond the current model that prioritizes discretion and
instead offer clearer, ex ante factors to help resolve questions of privilege.
As a thought experiment, this Essay has advocated for encouraging
stakeholders to explore a conflicts-based approach. This first means-to the
extent that parties have agreed expressly or impliedly (whether by
incorporation of institutional rules or otherwise)-the party choice of
applicable law should be honored. To the extent that states provide, either
through national law or a treaty, a legal default to address the absence of party
choice, that solution too respects a conflicts-based approach. Yet, when
neither of those solutions is available, it becomes necessary for adjudicators
to fill the void. In international arbitration, tribunals should look towards
conflict of laws principles as their divination rod for resolving quandaries
about the law applicable to attorney-client privilege. Choosing amongst
applicable laws-rather than creating their own-is inherently a conflicts
problem and requires a conflicts-based solution.
This Essay observes that, although the IBA Rules are an important tool for
managing the conflicts challenge, they are not the exclusive instrument
available. Rather, to guide tribunals in the process of selecting the applicable
law, the Essay encourages tribunals to move beyond simple declarations
about what law applies-whether national or international-to promote
transparency norms and demonstrate how the results are derived. By
benefitting from the insights of Judge Leflar, who encouraged the use of
"choice influencing considerations" as a method for resolving conflicts,
tribunals can gain pre-articulated, tried and tested factors to guide their
divination of the applicable law of privilege. Leflar's factors, gained from his
own experience as ajudge, are designed to promote transparency, aid counsel
in crafting arguments about real adjudicative influences (rather than
theoretical or formative methods), and offer a clear set of pre-articulated
principles to guide tribunal decision-making and promote rule of law.
As harmonized national laws, a treaty, or clear international law on the
content of attorney-client privilege is unlikely in the foreseeable future,
international arbitration should now strive to inject enhanced clarity and
predictability into the process of ascertaining what law applies. What is part
of the foreseeable future is the serious public focus upon and scrutiny of
international arbitration that is scrutinizing whether arbitration can provide
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value as a rule-of-law (rather than lawless) adjudication system. By shifting
the resolution of privilege disputes towards a conflicts analysis and adding
Leflar's insights, stakeholders can benefit from a methodology that retains
the flexibility to address the unique needs of each dispute, focuses on the
importance of predictability of party expectations about the confidentiality of
communications with counsel, and comports with rule of law norms by
offering grounded factors and transparent analysis. While there will
inevitably be more work to do in flushing out how these preliminary ideas
may work in practice, the larger point is to push forward the broader dialogue
to find ways to ensure that assessment of privilege issues aids, rather than
detracts from, the integrity of international arbitration.

